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EDITORIAL.
ABOUT THE MOOT COURT.
The moot court has for some time played
a larger role in the Dickinson School of
Law than in most other law schools, and
during the year just closing it has received
an emphasis never before put on it. Since
the commencement of the present school
year, two nights weekly, Tuesdays and
Thursdays, have been devoted to this
work. In the fall term, only the seniols
were engaged as counsel, because it was
thought that those who had just begun tile
study of law were not qualified to act in
this capacity with advantage to themselves
but since the opening of the long session
in January, both juniors and seniors have
been thus employed. Every Tuesday and
Thursday night two cases have been argued, one by seniors, and one by juniors.
Briefs are prepared in each case by every
attorney. Oral arguments are made in the
order, and as nearly after the forms as
possible, that obtain in court. The Dean
of the school has sat as Judge in every case
except one, havingibeen relieved on that
occasion by Judge Sadler. The cases cited
in the briefs and on the argument arc oxamined, and careful opinions are prep'ared
iii every case. Tim FOR UM contains a
record of this work for the year. The
preparation of some decisions has required
a large amount of tinle, as those exilerieneed in such matters will r adily understand. It has not infrequently happened
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that as many as fifty authorities have bcen

consulted.

As the purpose of tlile opinion

is somewlat diflireit from that Of the
opinions filed by the judges of the courts;
as it is designed not muerely to announce
the decision reached, and to indicate to
trained lawyers the principles that lave
conducted to it, but to assist students, to
clear up for them doubtful or difficult
points; the style observed in them diirentiates thei somewhat from that of tie
published olinions of the courts.
During tie last month of the session,
three llConbers of the senior class sat as
judges ill eaci 6ase, the juniors Olly being
counsel. Each judge was expected to
write an opinion. Tils practice has been
proven useful. It compels the student to
examine what is urged oil both sides of
the case, to balance consideratiolls against
each other, and to collate and larnionize
authorities. This is tile work which not
only the auditor or master does, but which
every lawyer does who is asked for advice
on questions that have 1ot yet assunied a
No lawyer is a
contentious character.
safe counsellor who has not learned to
ponder all pertinent autiorities 1)ro and
(on. Froi tie decisions of the court coinposed of seniors, il appeal Imas lain to the
Dean, sitting as a Sullerior or Supremte
court. Only one reversal has ttken )laue,
and the opinion of the lower court in that
ease was written with conspicuous vigor.
Several of the decisions of the lower court
were -as able as the problenis dealt with
were difficult.

THE FORUM.
THE FORUm has proven to be a great aid
to the moot court. Students take a larger
interest in their work since the substance
of their briefs appears therein and since
the decisions are there made accessible to
them. Indeed, perhaps the primary object
had in view in the establishment of that
journal was the development of interest in
the trials in court. We are able to say
from six months' experience, that it has
amply fulfilled the hopes with which it
was undertaken.
Cases have been solicited from other
practicing attorneys, and from alumni of
the school for use in the moot court. A
considerable percentage of the cases heard
and decided during the year have been
thus obtained. In due time the decision
appears in TuE FORUM, and we have the
testimony of several attorneys to the aid
thus furnished them in their own preparation.
We wish that every alumnus who should
read these lines would feel that to him
specially is directed an earnest request to
assist the work of the school, as well as
himself perhaps, by forwarding cases suitable for trial in the moot court.
We may add in conclusion that it is
understood to be the purpose of the school
authorities to extend still further the opportunity for practice in the moot court.

We are pleased to be able to give to our
readers this month such a full report of the
commencement exercises. The baccalaureate sermon, extracts of which appear,
was a splendid discourse and was delivered
with the oratorical effect for which President Reed is noted. Chief Justice Lore's
address to the graduates appears in full.
It was likewise excellent, and was full of
inspiration and sound advice. Coming
from a man of Judge Lore's reputation it
was all the more appreciated.
The members of the class of '97 have embarked on their professional cafeer. They
carry with them the best wishes of the faculty and all of those with whom they were
associated during the years of their preparation. May they in the coming years
give the school reason to be proud in numbering them among its alumni, as they feel
proud of the fact that they are graduates of
Dickinson School of Law.

The publication of this number of THE
FoRum marks the close of one of the most
successful years in the history of the Dickinson School of Law. The enrollment exceeded that of any previous year; the improvements to the building, made a year
ago, have been found to greatly facilitate
the work of the school; and the instruction
imparted through the daily recitations and
numerous lecturers was of the same high
standard and broad scope as heretofore.
In the department of actual practice
more has been accomplished than ever
before. This work has been very thorough
and extensive and was commenced earlier
in the students' course, so that the theory
and the practice might be the more
thoroughly and harmoniously blended.
The results accomplished in this department effectually overcome the last argument in disfavor of the training imparted
by a law school, and emphasize the fact
that the legal profession must still further
recognize, as the other learned professions
have done years ago, that the proper
method of obtaining a professional training is through the instrumentality of the
systematic work of a professional school.
The establishment of THE FORUm, as the
organ of the school is one of the accomplishments of the year, and of the success
of the enterprise we have abundant evidence. The many kind words that have
reached us from men prominent in the
legal profession, and numerous encomiums
from the press have been, to say the least,
encouraging, and our fondest hopes shall
be realized if our labors shall serve as the
beginning of a long and successful career.
The work of the present board of editors
and managers is done. To those who have
assisted and encouraged us during the
year, we return our sincere thanks, and to
our successors, we wish every possible
success.

ALUMNI.
Edward W. Shoemaker, '94, of Shenandoah, Schuylkill County, Pa.,- has acquired quite an extensive practice, especially in the criminal branch of the law.
He recently purchased a large library.
J. Harvey Beetem, of the class of '94,
is located at No. 717 South 16th Street,

THE FORU M.
Omaha, Nebraska. He has a half interest in a large chemical manufacturing
business there, and is devoting most of his
time to the successful management of the
same.
Charles S. Dakin, '92, was concerned in
several very important criminal cases before the Cumberland County Courts, recently. He was quite successful and congratulations poured in from every side.
George W. Huntley, Jr., of the class of
'93, who is now located at Mt. Carmel,
Pa., visited his Alma Mater a few weeks
ago. He gives a cheerful report of himself.
William B. Boyd, 196, recently swung
his shingle to the breeze in Carlisle and is
now engaged in the active practice of his
profession. He has his office with HoD.
Fillmore Maust, Esq.
Thomas P. Duffy,, '96, of Scranton,
spent a day at the School last month.
Bruce H. Campbell, '96, has recently
formed a partnership with Tiffany Blake,
Esq., in Chicago. The firm name is Blake
and Campbell, and their law offices are at
1010 Ashland Block. Mr. Campbell is already achieving much success.
John F. L. Morris, '94, of Philadelphia,
was married on June 1st, to Miss Sterry',
of New London, Conn., the ceremony
taking place at the residence of the
bride's parents. Mr. Morris' classmates
and friends at Dickinson wish him a pleasant marital voyage on the stream of life.
AN ALUMI ASSOCIATION.
Immediately after the Commencement
exercises, a meeting was held in the Law
School building for the purpose of forming
an Alumni Association. Prof. Geo. Edward Mills presided and after it was decided to form such an organization, the
following officers were elected for the ensuing year: President, Frank C. Bosler ;
Vice-President, Robert W. Irving; Secretary, Herman Berg, Jr.; Treasurer, J. S.
Omwake. A committee was appointed to
draft a constitution and by-laws. Much

interest was manifested and the success of
the association is assured. Among those
present besides the class of '97 were the
following: William H. Deweese, '93 ; J.
S. Omwake, '96; Win. F. Shean, '96; M.
J. Ruddy, '96; Chas. C. Greer, '93; R. V.
B. Lincoln, '96; D. L. Fickes, '96; W. H.
Stamey, '96; W. C. Webbert, '92; J. H.
Reiff, '95; Geo. E. Mills, '92; Frank C.
Bosler, '96; Lewis S. Sadler, '96; Caleb
Brinton, '95; John C. Long, '95; Edwin
Brightbill, '96; Herman Berg, '96; Chas.
S. Dakin, '92; W. B. Boyd, '96; C. C.
Bashore, '95; John M. Rhey, 196; C. W.
Rockow, '96.

THE SCHOOL.
DR. REEDS LECTURES.
President George Edward Reed on
Monday evening, May 12th, gave the third
and final lecture of the series on "Forensic Eloquence" before the law students.
Dr. Reed referred to emphasis; degree of
stress or force put into words; pause;
rhythm in speech; necessity of acquiring
a good vocabulary and means of doing so;
and self-mastery on the platform. Each
point, he elucidated plainly and exemplified the whole by reciting Hamlet's soliloquy. The three lectures were exceedingly helpful to the students, for the principles of oratory were given plainly and
in a way to show their practical adaptation. Before concluding, Dr. Reed agreed
to give lectures on the same subject next
term. The Junior class greeted the announcement with applause.
Important additions will be made to the
Law School library during the summer
vacation. The state reports of Michigan,
California and Missouri will be added.
The library is being enlarged yearly, and
has already reached a considerable size.
The volumes to be added give law much
quoted, and will be a great benefit to the
students.
THE THOMPSON PRIZE.
As previously announced in THE FoRuti
the Edward Thompson Company of Northport, Long Island, offered a set of The
Encyclopaedia of Practice and Pleading
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to that member of the graduating class
who should write a thesis on a subject to
be assigned by the faculty. The subject
assigned was, "The Defenses Available to
the Maker ofaPromissory Note against an
Endorsee." The prize was awardedto H.
Clay Beistel, of Amburst, Westmoreland
County, Pa. The prize is a worthy compliment to his ability as a student. Mr.
Beistel was the prime mover in the establishment of THE FORUM.
DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS.
The following communication from President George Edward Reed is explanatory
of an action by the college trustees bestowing the degree of Master of Arts upon
properly qualified law graduates.
To THE EDITORS OF THE FORum:
Gentlemen :-As the matter may be of
interest to some of the members of the
School of Law, I beg leave to call attention through Ti-rE FORUMi, to the action of

the trustea" of the college taken June, 1896,
namely :-" That graduates of respectable
colleges who shall complete in a satisfactory manner the required course .of the
Dickinson School of Law shall be eligible
for the degree of Master of Arts in cursu,
from the college."
The reason for this action was that the
work required of a college graduate in
the School of Law should be, and is, regarded as more than an equivalent for
the amount of work required by Dickinson
or by any other college, for the obtaining
of the degree of Master of Arts, through
college graduate work.
By virtue of this action any graduate of
the School of Law who has been regularly
graduated from a respectable College of
Arts is eligible for the degree in question.
Under this new rule in '96, the deoree of
A. M., in cursu, was conferred upon 'rank
C. Bosler, Esq., a graduate of Harvard
University, and later of the Dickinson
School of Law.
GEORGE EDWARD REED, President.
ALLISON SOCIETY.
The Allison Law Society has elected the
following officers for the first term of next
fall: President, G. H. Moyer; Vice-President, G. F. Vowinckle; Secretary, C. N.
Berntheisel; Treasurer, A. M. Devall;
Prothonotary, Charles E. Daniels; Sheriff,
G. F. Vowinckle; Justice of the- Peace, H.
H. Hess; District Attorney, Edwin S.
Livingood; Auditors, J. 0. Haas, W. L.
Snyder; Executive Committee, J. H. Vincent, Charles Shalters, E. G. Hutchinson;
Membership Committee, Charles E. Daniels, G. Frank Wetzel, Sylvester Sadler,
Albert I. Livingston.

The society has enjoyed a very prosperous year. It largely increased its membership, and conducted sessions full of interest. Its moot courts developed the
members in public speaking, and resulted
in bringing out much law along the line
of the cases tried. In conjunction with
the Dickinson society, lectures were given
during the year, the speakers being prominent members of the Cumberland County
Bar. At least four other leading practitioners have promised to appear before
the society early in the next term to lecture. The Allison Society is prosperous
and has a bright outlook for next year.

DICKINSON SOCIETY.
The year's work done by this society has
been the most satisfactory of any since its
organization.
The continued interest
taken by the members from the Senior
Class and the activity shown by the large
number of Juniors who joined early in the
year, has preserved for each meeting a
large attendance and a complete program,
toward which every man has contributed
with a zeal seldom found in society work.
The usual work has been the argument
of stated cases before members of the
Carlisle bar, about twenty of whom have
sat in the capacity of President Judge in
the Society Moot Court. Several others
have delivered carefully prepared lectures
on points in the law, and the gifted President cheerfully contributed a course of
lectures on Forensic Eloquence.
Unusual opportunities for parliamentary
practice have been afforded by the conten-.
tions of discordant elements and the wits
sharpened by the keen retorts, fierce invective and stirring eloquence of zealous
partisans who were training for the encounters that lay before them in the great
University of Life.
Horace Codington filled the first term
as President, and was succeeded by Harvey S. Kiser, Edmund L. Ryan, Simon P.
Northrup and Joseph F. Biddle.
At the last mbeting of the year, Friday
night, May 28th, there was a spirited contest for the choice of officers to serve for
the Fall Term and the activity manifested
in earlier meetings had in no wise abated.
At a special meeting held June 1st, the
following newly elected officials were installed:
President-Albert T. Morgan.
Vice-President-J.A. Sullivan.
Secretary-H. M. Persing.
Treasurer-P.E. Radle.
Sergeant-at-Arms-C. L. Roth.
Prothonotary-Martin F. Duffy.
Recorder-Martin R. Herr.
1egister-J.H. O'Brien.
Justice of Peace-PaulJ. Schmidt.
Sheriff-Robert Stucker.
DistrictAttorney-F. B. Moser.
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Dickinson has been making encouraging
progress in athletics during the last two
years. through the efficient and scientific
coaching of Dr. Stauffer, a U. of P. graduate, who has been engaged by the athletic
committee for that purpose. "Doe" has
been working most assiduously with the
boys, and the good results can be attributed
in a large degree to his faithful efforts.
The boys made a good impression in the
relay races at the Philadelphia meet, and
in the spring sports here on May 20th, the
records were broken in the quarter, half
and mile runs, two mile bicycle race, and
throwing the base-ball. The base-ball
team has been rounded into quite good
form and although they started in with
considerable raw material, a system of team
work has been developed which is creditable to coach and team and which is
winning games. Coach Stauffer will have
charge of the foot-ball team next season,
and is already putting some of the candidates through a light spring practice in
contemplation of picking the most promising for the early fall practice in some
quiet resort before the next fall term begins.
The Mficrocosm, the annual published at
Dickinson, appeared in May. It was issued by the Junior Class, and the committee in charge certainly performed their
work very efficiently. The Microcosm is
a very interesting and readable book,
while the many pictures are splendid. It
will be cherished in future years.
The class of '97 held a short meeting on
Monday forenoon, June 7th, and elected
officers for the ensuing year and at the
same time decided to have a banquet at
Carlisle next June. The officers elected
are as follows:
President, Chas. W. Hamilton, Pittsburg; Vice-president, Harvey S. Kiser,
Doylestown; Secretary, Paul H. Price,
Reading; Treasurer, Robert W. Irving,
New York City; Historian, Geo. W. Benediet, Jr., Scranton.
Frank C. Bosler, '96, of Carlisle, recently
presented the school with $100, to be used
in whatever way the school authorities
might see fit. Mr. Bosler has shown a
deep interest in his alma mater and his
liberality is greatly appreciated.

The degree of LL. D., was conferred on
Justice Henry W. Williams of tlhe Supreme Court ofPennsylvania, at the Commencement exercises on -'Monday, June
7th, Dickinson has honored itself by thus
recognizing the standing of the distinguished gentleman.

KIND WORDS.
Judge Yerks, of Bucks County, in a
recent letter to Dean Trickett writes as follows: "In reading your Law School publication, I have been particularly struck
with the good work of your boys. It
shows careful and conscientious instruction."

LAW SCHOOL REMINISCENCES.
Hon. Samuel Hepburn and Hon. R. M. Henderson Speak of Its Early Days.
Sixty-one years ago, the Reed School of
Law was established as a department of
Dickinson College. The era of law schools
had just dawned, and it was fitting, therefore, that one of the oldest educational institutions in the United States should thus
early place law as one of the adjunct
courses. Hon. John Reed, then President
of the Courts of Cumberland County, was
the founder, and his name appeared as
Professor of Law in the Faculty of Dickinson College. In 1890, the Reed School
became the Dickinson School of Law, today recognized as a leading legal institution.
The first student and one of the first
two graduates of the Reed School was
Hon. Samuel Hepburn, of Carlisle, and
who is still a prominent resident of the
town. Recently, Mr. Hepburn gave to
THE FoRuIat a number of interesting facts
concerning the early history of the school.
Mr. Hepburn read law with his uncle,
Hon. James Armstrong, afterwards a
member of the Supreme Court. Mr.
Hepburn intended locating at Harrisburg,
but an announcement of the law school
under Judge Reed's direction reached
him, and he came to Carlisle, where he
has since made his home. From 1839 to
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1849, Mr. Hepburn was Judge of the Courts
of Cumberland County, and of a district
including the counties of Cumberland,
Perry and Juniata; and by a special Act
of the Legislature, Mifflin and Dauphin
counties were added.
The first sessions of the law school were
held in the basement of what is now the
enlarged and remodeled residence of Rev.
George Edward Reed, D. D., LL. D.,
President of Dickinson College. The room
was small, but the students met there for
earnest work, and so well did they succeed that they laid a solid foundation for
a prosperous law school. Mr. Hepburn
was the first student to be enrolled by
Judge Reed. A short time afterwards, he
was joined by the second student, who
later forsook the law and became the
noted Rev. Alfred Nevin, D. D., of the
Presbyterian Church. They were the first
graduates of the Reed Law School. Within
a few years, the enrollment increased
rapidly and among those who graduated
and afterwards became prominent, were
Governor Andrew G. Curtin; Governor
Alexander Ramsey; Frank W. Hughes,
of Pottsville, Secretary of the Commonwealth; United States Senator Morgan;
Hon. Nathaniel B. Smithers, of Delaware; United States Senator James R.
Kelley, of Oregon; Hon. R. M. Henderson, ex-Judge of Dauphin County Courts;
Hon. Carroll Spence, Minister to Turkey
under President Pierce, and many others
who became well-known public men.
Mr. Hepburn immediately after his
graduation was admitted to practice in the
Courts of Cumberland County. and soon
afterwards Judge Reed announced his appointment as adjunct Professor of Law in
the Reed School. That was in the year
1835, and Mr. Hepburn remained a professor at the school for four years -when he
was appointed to the Bench of Cumberland
County, succeeding Judge Reed. Cases
were submitted to the students for argument every Saturday afternoon, Professor
Hepburn sitting as Judge, while Judge
Reed was the supreme court judiciary.
Mr. Hepburn left. his school work with
reluctance, but he felt that he could not
well continue after his appointment to the
bench. He took great delight in the law
school work, and expresses his belief that
no law school in the country has turned

out men more fully equipped or more who
attained prominence. In those years,
public commencements were not held.
After the death of Judge Reed, Hon.
James H. Graham was elected to the Professorship of Law in the College. He died
in 1882, and the science of law was not
represented in the courses of the college
from that time until January 9,1890, when
the President and Executive Committee
of the College unanimously authorized the
re-establishment of the Law School, and
it has since been under the efficient guiding hand of William Trickett, LL. D., as
Dean of the school. Its career has been
and is successful.
Hon. Robert M. Henderson, of Carlisle,
for fifty years a member of the Cumberland County Bar, is one of the oldest graduates of the Dickinson School of Law, or
as it was known in its early days the
Reed School. Judge Henderson is still
active in the practice of law, and he is one
of the most highly esteemed of Carlisle's
citizens. In the midst of a busy day recently he kindly gave to THE FORTUM a
number of interesting facts concerning the
early school. Ex-Judge Henderson was a
member of the class of 1847, the four others
being: John H. Blair, A. B., Carlisle;
Charles W. Carrigan, Philadelphia ; William M. Penrose, A. B., Lancaster; A. H.
Rose, Montrose. Law commencemenfs
were not held then. The sessions were at
the residence of Judge Reed, the dean,
but shortly before Mr. Henderson's graduation the sessions were transferred to Judge
Reed's office. Judge Henderson has now
an interesting catalogue of Dickinson College for the year of his graduation and under the law department is said, among
things minor, the following:
"April and November are the vacation
periods in this department, but students
are received at any period of the year without regard to vacation time.
"Stated recitations and examinations,
accompanied with familiar instruction,
occur twice a week.
"Discussions in the Moot Court are-held
once a week, when occasion is taken to deliver a lecture on the subject discussed.
"Students are prepared thoroughly for
admission to the Bar. The period of study
Is regulated in ordinary cases by the rules
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of the Court. The time now prescribed is
two years for a graduate of any respectable
college, or for one over the age of 21 years.
And three years for one who is not a
graduate of any college, and who is under
the age of 21.
"Upon a final and satisfactory examination, the degree of "Bachelor of Laws will
be conferred by the Faculty, but no student of bad morals shall receive the degree,
and the Faculty of the College shall have
concurrent judgment in the case with the
Professor of Law.
"The course of studies pursued in the
preparation of students for admission to
the Bar is as nearly as possible conformable
to the following order: Pennsylvania
Blackstone, Kent's Commentaries, Stephens on Pleading, Philip on Evidence, Fonblanque on Equity, Powell on Contracts,
Comyn on Contracts, Snyder-on Vendors,
Angel & Ames on Corporations, Pennsylvania Practice, Chitty on Bills, Paley on
Agency, Jones on Bailment, Collyer on
Partnership, Toiler's Law of Executions,
Theobald on Principal and Surety, Platt
on Covenants, Chitty on Pleading, Story
on Constitutional Law.
"No student is allowed to board or lodge
at a hotel, and frequenting a tavern needlessly will be esteemed a withdrawal from
the Institution."
The students were allowed the use of
Judge Reed's Library, which was a complete one. That, with the text books
mentioned, gave excellent opportunity for
legal research.
Judge Henderson was admitted to the
Cumberland County Bar in August, 1847.
He was elected by the Whig party to the
Legislature in 1851 and 1852. He served
by appointment in April, 1874, as additional law judge of the twelfth Judicial District, and was elected to the office in the
same year. He became PresidentJudge of
the District in January, 1882, but resigned
in March of the same year, and returned
to practice in Carlisle. Judge Henderson
was a colonel in the Civil War.

LIST OF GRADUATES.
SUBJECTS OF GRADUATION THESES.
,'Mechanic's Liens," Geo. B. Somerville, Houtzdale, Pa.

"Attachment Executions," Harvey S.
Kiser, Bursonville, Pa.
"Foreign Attachment," Edmund L.
Ryan, Smethport, Pa.
"Jurisdiction of the Orphans' Court,"
Willis E. Mackey, Altoona, Pa.
"Landlord's Remedies for the Recovery
of Possession at the Expiration of the
term," H. W. Savidge, Sunbury Pa.
"Liabilities of Sureties," Thos. K.
Leidy, Reading, Pa.
"Negligence of Guardians," Alfred J.
Feight, New Cumberland, Pa.
"Causes for Divorce in Pennsylvania."
John H. Williams, Plymouth, Pa.
"Res Gestae," Chas. W. Hamilton,
Pittsburg, Pa.
"Discontinuance of Actions in Pennsylvania," John E. Small, Catawissa, Pa.
"Duties, Powers and Liabilities ofSupervisors," Jos. F. Biddle, Bedford, Pa.
"Jurisdiction of Justices of the Peace
in Civil Actions," Geo. T. Brown, Freeland, Pa.
"Rights of Way," H. Franklin Kantner, Reading, Pa.
"Liabilities of Executors and Administrators," Paul H. Price, Reading, Pa.
"Jurisdiction of Justices of the Peace
in New Jersey," Simon P. Northrup,
Augusta, N. J.
"Distress for Rent," H. Clay Beistel,
Ambrust, Pa.
"Title by Adverse Possession in New
Jersey," Horace Codington, Bound Brook,
N.J.
"Remedies of Members of Corporations
and Societies with Reference to Expulsion," I. I.Wingert, Fayetteville, Pa.
"Admissions," Robert H. Barker, Philadelphia.
"Attorney's Compensation," Blake
Irvin, Brookville, Pa.
"Proof of Handwriting," Robert W.
Irving, New York, N. Y.
"Exemptions allowed Widows under
the Act of April 14, 1851," Harvey E.
Knupp, Harrisburg, Pa.
"Duties and Liabilities of Constables,"
G. B. Snyder, Wapwallopen, Pa.
"Spendthrift Trusts," Herman H. Griswold, Canton, Pa.
"The Plea of Non-Assumpsit," Julian
C. Walker, Wilmington, Del.
"Responsibility for Crime," Geo. W.
Benedict, Jr., Scranton, Pa.
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ILandlord and Tenant," Jas. P. Costello, Hazleton, Pa.
"Easements," J. R. Smith, Philadelphia.
"Boards of Health," A. A. Wingert,
Chambersburg, Pa.

THE COMMENCEMENT.
The sixth annual commencement of the
Dickinson School of Law was held on
June 7th as a part of the programme of
Dickinson College commencement, June
6-9. The class of '97 numbers twenty-nine
members.
The first of the commencement exercises was held in the Allison Methodist
Episcopal Church on Sunday morning,
June 6th. George Edward Reed, D. D.,
LL. D., President of Dickinson College,
delivered the baccalaureate sermon and
address to the college and law school graduates. His theme was "Christianity and
Modern Substitutes," and his text "For
there is none other name under Heaven
given among men, whereby we must be
saved."
In part President Reed spoke as follows:
Proposing this morning in our baccalaureate discourse a discussion of the past,
present and future of Christianity, as a
force for the regeneration and renovation
of human society with particular reference
to the substitutes which in odfr day are
being offered for the Christian system of
faith and morals, permit us in the first
place to attempt a definition of the term
so frequently upon our lips and yet in
general so ill understood, namely Christianity-a task, we may say in passing,
not so easy as would at first appear.
Broadly speaking, by Christianity we
mean the system of faith and morals, of
theory and practise, originating in and
inseparably connected with the life, teachings and work of Jesus of Nazareth. In
other words, Christianity is the religion of
Jesus Christ, just as Mohammedanism is
the religion of Mohammed, Confucianism
the religion of Confucius, Buddhism the religion of Buddha, with this important
difference, namely, that in Mohammedanism, Confucianism, Buddhism, Moham-

med, Confucius and Buddha are but the
names of men who lived and died ages
ago, while in Christianity, the Christ who
founded the system, not only lived and died
but still lives, still acts, still directs as a
personal force the fortunes of the system he founded, a claim made for neither
of the faiths we have mentioned.
In Christianity, however, the doctrine
of the living Christ is fundamental. Destroy that, and it sinks at once to the level
of the other systems with which it has been
and is in direct competition. The broad
definition, however, will not suffice. We
must particularize.
Doctrinally, Christianity teaches the
fatherhood of God, the brotherhood of
Inan; the universal sinfulness of man and
the need of sacrifice and propitiation in
order to gain rightness before God.
It implies the life, incarnation, sacrificial death, resurrection and continued
life of the Christ, the Son of the Living
God; that human salvation, forgiveness of
sin, everlasting life, are all conditioned
upon belief in Him as the sacrifice and
propitiation for the sins of the world, that
in his name, alone, is salvation; for "there
is none other name under Heaven given
among men, whereby we can be saved."
Ethically, all duties, all toward God,
all toward men may be summarized in the
words of the Master, "Thou shalt love the
Lord thy God with all thy heart and with
all thy soul and with all thy mind, and
thy neighbor as thyself." On those two
commandments hang all the Law and
the Prophets.
Institutionally, it comprehends the
Christian church,-all of every name, of
every religious body, of every clime, of
every nation, fearing God and keeping His
Holy Catholic
commandments,-the
Church of our Lord and Savior Jesus
Christ.
Historically, it began with the life and
teachings of Him whose name it bears,' 'the
year of our Lord" being the accepted starting point of what is known as the Christian era.
Jesus Christ did not, however, found a
distinctively new religion. Rather did He
claim that His mission was to fulfill
and not to destroy; to make good rather
than to make void. The essential doctrines of His system were old doctrines,
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co-eval mainly with the history of the
race.
"I am come," He said, "to reveal God
more fully, to give life more abundantly, to
bring, indeed, life and immortality to life."
This He did in life, in word, in deed, to
the immeasurable gain of the world.
2. The tremendous importance of Christianity as a factor in the progress of the
race, no sane man for a moment questions.
Supernaturalists and anti-supernaturalists, disciple and skeptic, friend and foe,
here join hands. By common consent,
without it the world's civilization would
have been impossible. The question to-day
is not as to its power and usefulness in'
the
past, nor as to its conserving influence in
the present, but rather as to its adaptability and adequacy for the era upon which
we are entering. Granting all that Christianity has been, and is, what of its future?
Has it spent its force? Having built up,
in the midst of barbarism and savagery
the splendid civilization of the present, is
it equal to the task of conserving its work,
and of advancing the same? Or, are we
to look for a substitute better fitted to cope
with twentieth. century problems than is
the magnificent but waning power to
which the world is so indebted. Some
say "Yes;" some "No." Which is right?
The question is on. Its enormous importance no man can question.
3. Dr. Reed then proceeded to discuss
the various substitutes which have been,
and are now being bffered, to replace the
Christian system, comprehending them
all under the following general heads:
Systems of Government.
Systems of Education.
Systems of Economics and Social Reforms.
In elucidating these points, he called
attention to the various governmental systems, monarchy, absolute and limited,
aristocracies and democracies, anarchism,
and the like, giving historical illustrations
of the effects of the various systems, and
showing everywhere the utter failure under each and every form to do away with
the sin, impiety and wretchedness of the
human heart. In setting forth Educational Substitutes, he called attention to
the ethical experiment carried on for 4,000
years in China; the Philosophical carried
on for 2,000 years in India; the Esthetic

culture of a thousand years in Greece; and
finally the substitute offered inthe teachings of modern Science,-all of which
after ample trial had but demonstrated
the truth that light alone-knowledge-never has been and, in the very nature of
things cannot be, sufficient to convert the
aberations of wills persistently perverted,
or energize those whose power of action
has been paralyzed by evil habits.
In treating of the substitutes offered
through the various economic and social
reforms, comprehended under the general
term Socialism, the speaker enlarged particularly upon the nature of the relief for
human ills alleged to be possible under a
complete change in the world's industrial
and economic systems; the abolition of all
private capital and the substitution of collective capital; the doing away with all
private ownership in ships, factories,
forges, sail boats, steamships and land; the
abolition of wages and profits; the substitution, in short, of collective for all individual effort, with equal distribution of
all the ultimate products of labor-the
scheme of the leading socialists of the day.
After describingthe Utopia, thelmillenial
condition in which, under this system, society would find itself, the Doctor next
proceeded to set forth the result of socialistic effort in various parts of tie world,
showing, through copious illustrations,
that nowhere, under any of them, had
human ills been lessened, righteousness
advanced or human happiness increased.
The socialism of the gospel of Jesus Christ
only has met, or can meet the world's needs.
Having finished the discussion of the
various substitutes, Doctor Reed next
raised the question, "Is there any need of
asubstitute?" "Is Christianity the waning power it is said to be?" In reply to
these questions the speaker reviewed
briefly the triumph of Christianity, what
it has done, what it is doing, what it can do
provided men will but make the experiment of its truths, claiming that nowhere
under fair trial, and under its own conditions had there ever been instance of failure. Everywhere, always, and forevermore, it has been, is, and ever will be,
"The power of God unto Salvation to
everyone that believeth."
In conclusion the reverend speakermade
an earnest appeal to those about to gradu-
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ate to reject all vaunted substitutes, to uphold and defend a system fraught only
with good and outside of which is no salvation.
To the graduates of the Law School, Dr.
Reed said:
GENTLEMEN OF THE LAW CLASS OF '97:-

The profession to which you are soon to
belong, and for which here you have been
making preparation, is one of the noblest
and most venerable of human history. A
profession the records of which are adorned
with names that shine like glittering stars
in the firmament of the legal heavens, the
lustre of which can never fade, the glory
of which is limited by no boundaries of
sea or land.
A profession, the practice of which is
fraught with weal or woe to the dearest
rights of man, and for which in our age at
least, no human preparation can ever be
fully adequate. So complex indeed have
become the relationships existing in our
modern, social and political organization,
so vast and far reaching the interests involved and so delicate the work of the
proper adjustment of these interests, that,
more than ever, are needed men thoroughly trained in the various forms of legal
procedure in vogue in court and office,
and, above all, men inspired by the loftiest
ideals of probity and virtue, and holding
the strictest standards of morals, of public
and private faith.
In your hands are to rest interests of
property, interests of life, interests of
sacred honor.
To you will be confided secrets, known,
it may be, to no eye, save that of God.
Upon your discretion, knowledge of law
and general wisdom, fortunes will depend.
To you will come the merchant in his
trouble, the farmer in his distress,
the widow in her grief, the orphan
in his desolation, the workman with his
wrong, the capitalist with his threatened
loss, the guilty in his despair, the innocent
in his noble effort for freedom or redress,
-and he must not come in vain.
Your sign, hung out to public gaze,"Counsellor-at-Law," gives him right to
come, and by your judgment he will
largely be guided. Your responsibility
will be great, and your reward should and
will be proportionate to the responsibility.
For this great service you have been mak-

ing preparation. To gain the preparation
the better, you came to the Dickinson
School of Law.
Here you have studied, guided in your
work by the experienced teachers under
whose direction yourwork has been carried
on. Foryou, asforthose already addressed,
the end of this form of your preparatory
work has come. Note that I say "'preparatory," because thus far, if your study of
the mighty subject of Law has taught you
one thing rather than another, it is that
your work of preparation, instead of being
ended, has really but begun. You have,
however, a good start.
Our hope for each of you,-the hope of
your dean, the hope of your faculty, is
that as lawyers, you may not only gain a
livelihood, but also in the gaining of a
livelihood display that regard for justice,
that fine sense of honor, that absolute loyalty to right, which have ever characterized those great lawyers by whose character and labor the legal wisdom of the world
has been enriched, by whom human
rights have been vindicated and more
amply secured, by whose genius and eloquence the course of justice has been advanced and by whose toil the monuments
and safe guards of human liberty have
been rendered sacrosanct and invincible.
Gentlemen of the Law Class of '97,Hail! Hail and Farewell."
Special music was rehdered by a select
choir under the direction of Joseph V.
Adams, '98, college, and E. N. Fought
presiding at the organ. The music was
entrancing, and thoroughly enjoyed by
the graduates and the audience. A solo
by Miss Ratharine Boyer was finely executed, while a duet by Miss Halbert and
J. L. Sigmund, '98, college, was delightfully rendered.
IN BOSLER HALL.
The graduation exercises proper took
place in Bosler Hall on Monday afternoon,
June 7, at 4 o'clock. Under the motto,
Lex est fundamentumjustiliae et liberatis,
the class of '97 was launched out on the
sea of life. The pretty auditorium was
filled with friends of the college and of the
graduates. The Seniors, for the first time
in the history of the Law School, appeared in caps and gowns, the purple border

t

HON. CHARLES B. LORE, LL. D.,
Chief Justice, Supreme Court, Delaware.

THE FORUM.
bespeaking the law degree. While the
scene presented was a pretty one, it was
also impressive, as the exercises progressed
from the overture to the conferring of the
degrees.
The committee in charge consisted of
J. B. Smith, Chairman; Blake Irvin,
George T. Brown, A. Joel Feight and A.
A. Wingert. The ushers were A. T.
Morgan, G. H. Moyer, George F. Wetzel,
Charles S. Shalters, Fred. B. Moser, Sylvester V. Sadler, Miles H. Murr and J. B.
T. Caldwell, of the Junior class. The
music was furnished by the college orchestra. Their exquisite work lent much
to the enjoyment of the occasion, and won
for them many encomiums. "Harvest
Home," Tobani, was the overture.
George B. Somerville was the class orator and his address, "The Embryo Lawyer," was given as the first number of the
programme. As the subject signifies, Mr.
Somerville treated of the young man entering the legal profession and he pictured
the sky of his existence during the days
when he is an embryo lawyer. Mr. Somerville clothed his thoughts in the purest
diction and uttered them with fine oratorical effect. The conferring of the degrees was an interesting part of the exercises.
The baccalaureate addre,s was delivered
by Charles B. Lore, LL D., Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court of Delaware. Chief
Justice Lore is a man who at the outset
commands the attention of his audience,
and he then holds his hearers. His address was brim full of helpful advice, and
given in the choicest garb of expression.
Chief Justice Lore's address follows in
full.
The motto on the seal of the Dickinson
School of Law: "Lex est fundamentum
justitiaeetlibertatis," which maybe freely
translated "law is the foundation of
justice and liberty," is at once a happy expression of the scope of your school and a
terse and exhaustive statement of the work
of law, in forming and preserving human
society.
To say that liberty is the aim and end of
law, and that it is a necessary outgrowth
of the maintenance of justice, is to state a
truism. There can be no healthy human
liberty without law. There can be no just

law that does not grow out of a state of
liberty. "Necessity, the tyrant's plea,"
wrote John Milton in Paradise Lost.
"Where law ends, tyranny begins," rang
out the clarion notes of William Pitt, Earl
of Chatham, in his speech in the Wilkes
Case in 1770; and in his speech on the India Bill, in 1783, he declared, "Necessity is
the argument of tyrants, it is the" creed of
slaves." So that justice and liberty may
be fitly termed twin sisters, abiding in the
midst of every nation, where law is the
highest expression of sovereignty.
Toward the close of the sixteenth century, broad-minded Richard Hooker
penned these words: "Of law there can be
no less acknowledged than that her seat is
the bosom of God, her voice the harmony
of the world; all things in heaven and
earth do her homage, the very least as
feeling her care, and the greatest as not exempt from her power." In his Excise
speech in 1783, Pitt epitomized this thought
in good strong Anglo-Saxon, when he
said: "The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the force of the
crown; it may be frail, its roof may shake,
the wind may blow through it, the storm
may enter, the rain may enter, but the
King of England cannot enter; all his
forces dare not cross the threshold of the
ruined tenement." The English peasant's
home was his castle. The law built up
about that home, however humble, a wall
of sacred and inviolable protection that
bade defiance to the marshalled hosts of
the empire. These words of Pitt's were
uttered in the crisis of the American Revolution and in behalf of the thirteen
colonies, then in the throes of their struggle for a government of law, against the
unbridled tyranny of George the Third
and his ministers. These words struck
the keynote of Saxon liberty; fired the
hearts of all just English men, and fnspired with new courage the patriots on
this side of the Atlantic. It is hard to tell
just how much they contributed to our independence.
Where the government is one of law, the
humblest man is clothed with all of the
majesty and power of the State. In her
courts of justice, he stands absolutely the
peer of the highest and the mightiest.
The study and practice of law, in all
ages, has opened up the widest fields of
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human us;efulness and power. In these
fields, the master mind sees and deals with
the sources of human society, and is in
touch with all the tides and currents of
life. In the last resort, law is but the expression of the will of God. In the material universe, this will moves with
noiseless and resistless certainty. The best
human laws are but an effort to approximate this divine will, and they approach
completion just in so far as they harmonize
with that will. The perfection of individual and of social law is expressed by
the psalmist when he says, "I delight to
do thy will 0 God, yea thy law is within
my heart."
The government of the United States is
the highest product thus far of human
civilization and constitutional liberty. It
was created by, and exists only in and
through that grand product of human
foresight and sagacity, the constitution of
1787. Unlike other nations, our form of
government did not grow up through
ages of conflict between freedom and slavery, but sprang into existence at once, like
Minerva from the brow of Jupiter, full
grown, fully armed and equipped. Itwas
created, expressed, and limited by that
document, which is conceded by the Savans
of the Old World, to -be a masterpiece of
Constitutional law. Our fathers builded
more wisely than they knew, when they
founded the temple of our liberties upon
that Constitution. Our Government was
created by law; subsists now, and must
continue to subsist, by law, and by law
only, as its vital breath.
But gentlemen of the class of 1897, it is
idle to waste time further upon this
thought, and in this presence. You fully
comprehend the dignity and the majesty
of law. You have made a choice of the law
as your intellectual mistress. You have
made your knightly vows at her shrine.
For four years you have been eating, drinking and sleeping with Coke and Blackstone; with Kent and with Story, and
perhaps with the host of lesser lights,
the voluminous law book-makers of later
years. You have doubtless puzzled your
brains over the "rule in Shelly's Case,"
"the executory devise," "the contingent
remainder," "shifting and resulting uses
and trusts," you have chased and perchance embraced the elusive "estate of

freehold" and the vague something called
"benefit of clergy" to find out what they
really were. You have ascended and descended the ladder of descent and of consanquinity, which ladder, if you were
touched with pride of birth, mayhap you
hoped might reach like Jacob's ladder up
into the cloudy and exclusive regions of
the blue blood of the Old World, or if
fashioned in sturdier, mould you have
sought only some stalwart ancestor to imitate and to excel.
During those four years how often you
have wandered up and down the old campus, sometimes by moonlight, while the
mind drifted out into the future and went
castle building. Then you were filled with
the high purpose to make your mark in
the world and to leave your foot-print on
the sands of time. Generally you were
alone, but sometimes there was another
with you. A gentle hand rested on your
arm, a gentle voice and spirit blended
with your dream of greatness, and you two
together fashioned a blended hereafter.
For though law is a jealous mistress and
brooks no rival, yet it is well settled that
bachelors of law sometimes fall from grace
and become brothers-in-law and benedicts
before the altar and at the shrine of love.
Gentlemen, I shall not lift the veil upon
those scenes. They are sacred to you and
to that other one. My theme is law, not
love. I shall not invoke those voices from
the campus further than to say that they
were not the voices of Coke, Blackstone,
Kent, Story, or any other recognized legal
authority. We may however be permitted
to congratulate the class of '97, and those
other ones, if present, that the four corners
of the old campus are not phonographs to
repeat exactly what was said and done
then and there.
But those days are gone. Your novitiate
is ended. You stand on the outer threshold
of the school of law, looking outward upon
the swirling tides of human life into which
you are about to plunge either for good or
for evil. There is no middle ground, no
standing still. The law of your being is
that you must go forward, or you will go
backward.
May we not then cast the horoscope and
see what you may be and by what rules
you may govern your professional life?
Of one thing be assured, your success in
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your profession will be just what you make
it. Each man makes his own stature,
builds himself. Each one fashions his own
life as he will. I do not mean to say that
there are not tides in the affairs of men,
but I do say that in order to succeed those
tides must be taken at their flood. You
may not drift idly about until the flood
comes and then drift on with it; but must
work so that you may take the tide when
it comes, and see to it that ii leads on to
fortune. In the attainment of human happiness and success, we move in obedience
to the divine law, and do not depend upon
the hazard of chance.
You cannot be too highly impressed with
the dignity and importance of your profession. In the United States it is ordinarily
the avenue to places of highest honor and
trust and of greatest responsibility. Your
success will be measured by your love for,
and devotion to your profession, as a science
involving all human interests. The man
who follows the profession of law only to
make money has no conception of his relation to society. Inevitably such a one will
gravitate into a shyster or a pettifogger.
He would be as much out of place among
the men who love law as a science, and
through it seek mainly human good, as
Lucifer would be in heaven. The lawyer
whose soul is no bigger than his fee methinks is of the class of whom our Saviour
spoke: "Woe unto you also, ye lawyers,
for ye lade men with burdens grievous to
be borne, and ye yourselves touch nbt the
burdens with one of your fingers." Such
lawyers never hear the music of moving
worlds nor behold the power and beauty
of the laws of life, but only hear the clinking of the shekels.
Aprimal condition of success in law is
absolute integrity and sincerity. Absolute
truth to one's better nature. In the main
the people measure and weigh a man correctly. In the epigrammatic language of
Lincoln: "You may deceive all men
sometimes; you may deceive some men
all the time, but you cannot deceive all
men all the time." A man will gravitate
in society to the precise level of his character. It may take some time to find his
level, but it will be reached if he lives
long enough.
The man who begins life by trying to
deceive others finds out in the end that he

has only succeeded in deceiving himself.
A favorite saying of Aaron Burr, who was
an astute legal practitioner, was: "That
is law, which is clearly stated and plausibly maintained." Yet Aaron Burr lived
long enough to find out that the practice
of this maxim landed him into social and
political ostracism; shunned by all
good men, and a lone wanderer on the
Battery in the great city of New York;
loved and honored only by a devoted and
gifted woman, his daughter Theodosia.
No lawyer is called upon to defend
wrong or injustice. He cannot do so without sacrificing his self-respect. The oath
he takes, to be true and faithful to the
Court and his client, does not involve any
such condition. That oath substantially
is that he will behave himself in the office of an attorney within the Court according to the best of his learning and
ability, and with all good fidelity as well
to the Court as to the client; that he will
use no falsehoods, nor delay any person's
cause through lucre or malice. His highest duty, therefore, to the Court and to his
client is to prevent wrong and injustice.
It sometimes happens that lawyers, in
their zeal for clients, are carried beyond
the borders of right, but every such lapse
tells against the lawyer's highest developmen't and robs him of a part of his moral
manhood. There is a popular idea that a
lawyer must stand by his client right or
wrong. So a lawyer should stand by his
client, but only so far as to see that that
client has every protection that the laws
of God and of man justly vouchsafe to him.
He may go no further without sacrificing
his manhood and violating his oath of
office. Every lawyer must draw the line
for himself. That line may be safely
drawn in this wise: Never identify yourself with a client who is a scoundrel or
whose methods are tricky, or with a cause
that your judgment and conscience tell
you is wrong. Maintain above all else
your moral integrity and self-respect. Do
not barter them for silver or gold. In the
beginning you may lose some clients; but
build up for yourself a character for integrity and there will gather about you clients
who will ask of you only that which is
right. You will then find that honest
clients make honest lawyers. Starting in
your profession you may take the honest
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or the tricky class of clients. You may
make your choice and you will soon find
that the public will associate you with
them.
If you select the tricky, honest
clients will take other counsel and you
naturally will gravitate into the class of
practice that you have elected.
In dealing with the Courts there is one
safe rule: Never urge before the Court a
proposition that you are satisfied is not law,
simply in order to win your case. At first
the Court will trust you, but if they find
out that you have wilfully deceived them,
ever afterwards your propositions will require verification. Aside from this no
lawyer can maintain for himself, and try
to make others believe those propositions
to be law which he knows are not law,
without blunting his moral perception.
Persistence in such a course will ultimately unsettle his judgment and make
him uncertain as to what is right and
what is wrong. One cannot associate with
and hug falsehood to his bosom habitually,
without losing his hold on truth. The insincere man can never take an abiding
hold upon the people. Insincerity soon
becomes tranmparent. The people read
such a man and will have none of him.
Sincerity is an essential element of real
success.
Your success will be largely measured by
your willingness and capacity to work.
The late Chief Justice ofDelaware, Edward
W. Gilpin, when asked by a young lawyer
what course he should adopt to succeed in
his profession, said, "Young man, put your
feet under your office table and keep them
there." Otherthings being equal, that one
of your number who has the will and the
largest capacity for hard, connective labor
will climb up to the highest round of the
ladder of success. I know no better definition of genius, than that it is the largest
capacity for concentrated, consecutive labor. There is no profession in which hard
work tells as effectively as in the law. Men
of most brilliant promise have often failed
because they relied upon inspiration. There
is no inspiration in the realm of law. On
the other hand, the earnest, honest plodder
will achieve marked success, winning the
prize by hard earned knowledge.
It is difficult to lay down any system of
iron-clad rules, or mark with certainty the
path of success. The conditions change

with the mutations of society.

The accu-

mulation of capital in large corporations,
and the exacting demands of corporate life
have tended to make the corporation lawyer largely a business machine. Themarvelous development of the modern newspaper and the multiple power of the press
have largely taken the lawyer's place as a
director of the political and legal drifts of
the nation. The practice of law isbecoming
daily more and more a methodical piece of
business mechanism, instead of the discursive journeying into the wide field of abstruse and often technical learning, mainly
in relation to real estate.
The all round lawyer of the type of
Blackstone, has changed into the modern
legal athlete in the field of specialty. The
old real estate lawyer has almost disappeared. We have now the patent lawyer,
the admiralty lawyer, the commercial lavyer, the corporation lawyer, and those of
other lines ; all expressive of modern development in the field of law. Instead of
gathering together as the Athenians did
at the foot of the Acropolis to learn of the
smooth-tongued Demosthenes whether
there should be peace or war, instead
of gathering in the forum and in the
amphitheatre as the Romans did to listen to the thrilling oratory of Cicero in
order to learn the latest phase of national thought and policy; the people of
to-day, in this western world of ours, sitting at their firesides, from the morning
newspaper, before breakfast, read the utterances of the brainiest men the world
over, and hear the heart-beats of every
nation of earth. We no longer need the
Clays and Websters, the Calhouns and
men of that ilk, who, like Saul of Tarsus,
stood head afid shoulders above their fellows; to be leaders of our national thought
and dictators of our national policy. The
press, that great leveler, has closed up the
gap and brought all men nearer to an
equality. But changed and modified as it
is, the law still is the open sesame to political life and honor and presents a wider
range for usefulness than any other field.
In it the possibilities of one's usefulness
are limited, only by one's capacity.
Young gentlemen, your lives are before
you. For thirty-five years your speaker
has been engaged in the practice of law;
his life, therefore, is largely in the past.
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"Son, go out, but bring back with you
In the light of that life experience let
him beseech you, that you put your ideal your shield, or let your dead body be
high up in the scale of life. Form and brought back upon it."
persist in some exalted purpose, the attainAs you now enter upon your life's work
ment of which will leave the world better let me commend to you the language of
because you have lived in it. Everything
Longfellow's Psalm of Life.
that you undertake, do well. Slight
"In the world's broad field of battle,
nothing. Learn the habit of faithful exIn the bivouac of life,
actness and conscientious labor. Such a
Be not like dumb driven cattle !
course will give Dickinson School of Law
Be a hero in the strife !
no cause to blush for the Class of '97.
Trust no future how'er pleasant!
There is one book that I would commend
Let the dead past bury its dead!
as your constant companion, that you take
Act-act
in the living present!
it as your guide. It is the law of life. No
Heart within and God o'erhead!
man can build character wisely, or lay out
the plan of life safely, who does not take
Lives of great men all remind us
counsel from the Revealed Word of God.
We can make our lives sublime,
A bosom friend of Daniel Webster, and one
And departing, leave behind us
of his most sagacious critics has said, that
Foot-prints on the sands of time;
Webster was never grander, neveruttered
Foot-prints that perhaps another,
a more impressive thought, than one night
Sailing o'er life's solemn main,
out on the waters near Marshfield, his
A forlorn and shipwrecked brother,
home by the sea, as he repeated the Eighth
Seeing shall take heart again.
Psalm. The wind had lashed the waves
Let us then be up and doing,
to fury, a terrific storm brooded over the
With a heart for any fate;
water; the blackness of the storm was
Still achieving, still pursuing,
lighted up at intervals with blinding
Learn to labor and to wait."
flashes of lightning; their frail boat was
borne now on the crest and then in the
You represent and are a part of the civitrough of the sea, and while terror had lization of the closing years of the nineseized all others, Webster alone was un- teenth century. You hold in your hands
moved, and in his deep-toned voice accom- all the accumulated and concentrated
panied at intervals with the mutterings of forces of that century, so big with human
the thunder he repeated those words of the progress. Possessed of those forces, your
psalmist, that marvelous revelation of lives will be projected largely into, and
divine power. The writer says he was become a part of the twentieth century.
never so impressed by mortal man. The Its unknown and magnificent possibilities
greatest lawyers have been deeply versed will be yours. Will you mould them, or
in the Bible truths.
be moulded by them ? It is for you to say.
Permit me to say that in coming years, By us the result can only be read in the
I shall remember your names and watch light of your hereafter.
your progress with deep interest. United
With parting words, let me now drop
with you in a bond of sympathy in your into the heart and consciousness of each
life work, it will be a pleasure to remember
individual member of your class, there to
that I stood by your side, and was privi- abide, that beautiful admonition in Bryleged to offer words of cheer, as you girded ant's Thanatopsis:
up your loins and started out to do battle "So live, that when thy summons comes
for yourselves, your alma mater, your
to join
country, and your God. See to it that The innumerable caravan, that moves
when you come to account for the use of the To that mysterious realm, where each shall
talents with which the Creator endowed
take
you, you be not ashamed of the reckoning.
His chamber in the silent halls of death,
Representing your alma mater to-day, Thou go not, like the quarry slave, at
which sends you out into the battle oflife,
night,
I would say in the language of the Spartan Scourged to his dungeon, but sustained and
mother when she sent her son to battle:
soothed
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By an unfaltering trust, approach thy
grave,
Like one that draws the drapery of his
couch
About him, and lies down to pleasant
dreams.?)

With your work well done, this would
be a glorious end of life's fitful fever.

THE MOOT COURT.

Instead of paying the $500, Saunders at
the time of bestowing the name, viz:January 17, 1885, executed a promissory
note of this tenor:McConnellsburg, Pa.,
January 17, 1885.
When Mahogany Coffin reaches the
age of 21 years, I promise to pay to him
$500 with interest from date without defalcation, value received.
CHARLES SAUNDERS.

This is an action by Mahogany Coffin
on the note.
Saunders defends:MAHOGANY COFFIN.v& CHARLES
1st. Want of consideration.
SAUNDERS.
2d. No consideration promised or furnished by the plaintiff.
Promissory note-Consideration--Allega3d. The alleged contract was a joke.
tion of joke no defence topromisor.
We shall take tip these three points in
inverse order.
their
Assumpsit.
1st. There is no evidence to show or
J. AUSTIN SULLIVAN and G. FRANx
even tending to show that this note was
WETZEnL for the plaintiff.
ever understood by either party as a joke.
A promise is a sufficient consideration
This being the case, we must presume that
imnote
for a promise and a promissory
ports a valuable consideration. Clark, it was made and accepted in all good
Contracts, 155-165; Hartman v. Shaffer, faith. Hartman v. Shaffer, 71 Pa. 312.
71 Pa. 312.
We deem it inadmissible to hold that the
When a promise is made for the benefit bestowal of a name is a valueless act, and
made
may
it
is
of another, he for whom
bring an action for-its breach. Clark, Con- if once it be granted to be of some value,
tracts, 159; 3 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, then in the absence of fraud, it must be
863; Hind v. Holdship, 2 Watts 104; Hos- held to possess the value placed upon it by
teller v. Hollinger, 117 Pa. 606.
The privilege of naming a child, grant- the contracting parties. In this case,
ed by the father of the child .tothe maker there is .no question of fraud.
of a promissory note in favor of the child,
2d. The second point is equally ill
is a sufficient consideration to support founded. The contract was made for the
the note. Wolfort v. Powers, 85 Ind. 294;
plaintiff's benefit; at least such benefit is
Eaton v. Libbey, 165 Mass. 218.
FRED. C. MILLER and EDWIN S. Lrv- the direct result of its performance.
Again the plaintiff's father, the promisee,
LNGOOD for the defendant.
has a legal interest that the promise be
1. There is no consideration to support
performed in favor of his son. This brings
the promise.
2. No consideration was promised or the ease directly within the rule laid
furnishedby the plaintiff.
down in Hind v. Holdship, 2 Watts 104,
3. The alleged contract was a joke. and in Durnherr v. Ran, 135 N. Y. 219,
There being no real contract, the action
that a person for whose benefit a promise
must fail.
is made may bring an action for its breach.
and
J.,
KNwUPP
P.
Before WALKER,
3d. The real question, however, on the
BENEDICT, JJ.
merits of the case is presented by the reOPINION OF THE COURT.
maining point, whether there was any or
WALK R, P. J.:-John T. Coffin has a sufficient consideration. It is not necesson born. An intimate friend, Charles sary that the consideration for a promise
Saunders, told him that he, Saunders, should be a property one. Bainbridge v.
would give the child $500 if Coffin would Firmstone, 8 A. & E. 743; Hempler v.
Schneider, 17 Mo. 258; Train v. Gald,
allow him, Saunders, to name him.
Coffin assented and Saunders bestowed 5-Pick. 380; Lindell v. Rakes, 60 Mo. 294.
The last case is a peculiar one. There the
upon the child the name Mahogany,
consideration of the note sued on was the
which he has ever since borne.

V

L
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payee's promise to abstain from the use of
intoxicating liquors for eight months; and
it was held to be sufficient to support the
note. The father is the natural guardian
of his child, and possesses the right and
privilege of bestowing upon it his own or
any other name. The defendant bargained for the exercise of the right, and
we think he should bebound, for by his
bargain he limited and restrained the
father's right. Wolfort v. Powers, 85Ind.
294.
The facts in the last quoted case are very
similar to the case at bar. A few quotations from the opinion of the court appear
to apply equally well here. "We can discover no good reason for deciding that the
right with which the father parted, at the
defendant's request, was of no value. To
be sure, the consideration was an indeterminate one,and one which the parties alone
were competent to measure and determine.
When a party contracts for the performance of an act which will afford him pleasure, gratify his ambition, or please his
fancy, his estimate of value should be left
undisturbed, unless there is evidence of
fraud. In yielding to the defendant's request, and in consideration of the promise
accompanying it, the father certainly suffered some deprivation and surrendered
some right."
Judgment for plaintiff.
Appeal by the Defendant.
Error assigned, entry of judgment as
above.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
For the promise of Charles Saunders to
pay to Mahogany Coffin $500, the consideration was that Coffin's father, John T.,
would allow him, Saunders, to bestow the
name. The father assented, the namewas
bestowed, and the note was executed and
delivered. The consideration is adequate.
It was the omission of the father to exert
a right in other modes, the carriage by the
child of the name imposed, the gratification of the vanity, or caprice of Saunders.
In Wolfort v. Powers, 85 Ind. 294, a promise to pay $10,000 found sufficient consideration in the bestowal of a name on the
dictation of the promissor. Of a note supported by a similar consideration, payment was enforced in Eaton v. Libbey, 165
Mass. 218; Cf. Clark, Cont. 149.

It is urged that, if there was a consideration, it did not move from the plaintiff,
but from his father. But (a) were this
true, it would not be an obstacle to the recovery. This is not an action by one man,
on a promise made to another. Saunders
not only promised John T. Coffin to pay
the son $500; but he also promised the son.
The promise to the father was oral. That
to the son was in the note in suit. The
action is not on the oral promise to John
T. Coffin, but upon the written promise to
Mahogany. And the action is by Mahogany, the promisee. This suit does not run
athwart the principle that only the promisee can enforce the promise. Is it necessary that the consideration should
move from the promisee? We have met
no ease that so holds. A in order to procure a benefit to B, from C, gives a consideration to C, in view of which C promises B to bestow the benefit. A and B are
so connected that B, we think, can invoke
the consideration furnished by A, to support C's promise to him. In Wolfort v.
Powers supra, the note %Vas made payale to the father, and the suit was by
him, but in Eaton v. Libbey supra, the
action was by the child on a note payable
to him. (b) "The child," as was remarked by Barker J, Eaton v. Libbey, "cannot be said to have no interest in the
name imposed. The consequences affect
the child more than anyone else. He is
deprived of the advantage of receiving
any other name, and is subjected to the
possibility of detriment because he bears
the name imposed." The parent is the
natural guardian of the child, and may
be regarded as representing it, in bestowing upon it a name. In a substantial
sense we think the consideration may be
deemed to flow from Mahogany.
That the transaction was a joke, is a
mere suggestion without evidence. It is
not disputed that the name negotiated for
was actually imposed on the plaintiff, nor
that the note sued upon was executed and
delivered to the plaintiff, or his father for
him. That itwas entered into in a spirit of
banter and humor, does not deprive it of
legal obligatoriness.
Something was said at the hearing,
concerning the right of a minor to maintain an action. Normally his action should
be by him, by his guardian or next friend.
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Turner v. Patridge, 3 P. & W. 172; Heft v.
McGill, 3 Pa. 2.56. The junction with him
of such guardian or friend is, however, to
secure the defendant for his costs. Of the
omission to unite the guardian or prochein
ami, advantage must be taken by plea of
abatement, or by motion to dismiss. Heftv.
McGill, supra, 10 Am. & Eng. Encyc.
Law, 684.
The note was not payable until the
payee should reach the age of 21 years.
An action brought before that time would
have been premature. But, in the court
below, none of the objections to recovery
was founded on the minority of the plaintiff. It is too late now to deny that he had
attained his majority.
Judgment affirmed.

JOHN HART vs. ALEXANDER JOYCE.
Doctrine of estoppel inapplicableto minors-,vidence--Questionforjury-Gift.
Motion for a new trial.
JACKSON ORLANDO HAAS and

MARTIN

F. DUFFY for the plaintiff.

1. First instruction was improper because
plaintiff, being a minor, is not estopped
from denying the defendant's ,ownership.
7 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 24; Keen v.
Coleman, 39 Pa. 299;Sims v. Everhardt,
102 U. S. 300; Handy v. Canning, 166 Mass.
107.
2. It is for the jury to say what effect
the declarations of the seven witnesses had
upon plaintiff's testimony.-Gabler's Appeal, 5 Cent. 314; Eldred v. Hazlett, 33 Pa.
S07.
EDWIN G. HUTCHINSON and E. H.
HOFFMAN for the defendant.

1. Plaintiff by his conduct was estopped
to allege a different state of facts.-Larkins
v. lead, 77 Ala. 485; Dodge v. Pope, 93
Ind. 480;- Genoa v. Alstine, 108 Ill. 555;
Caswell v. Faller, 77 Me. 105; Weaver v.
Lutz, 102 Pa. 593; Powell's Appeal, 98 Pa.
403.
2. Third instruction was correct, gift being irrevocable.-Greenfield's Estate, 14 Pa.
489 ; Hess v. Brown, 111 Pa. 124; Hunt v.
Hunt, 119 Mass. 474.
Before PRICE, P. J., SNYDER and IRVIN,
JJ.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

PRICE, P. J.:John Hart was a grandson of Alexander
Joyce, living with the latter. When he
was 14 years old, Joyce bought a piano, of

which he now has the possession. Hart,
who is now 20 years of age, brings this replevin to recover the piano, alleging that
it was bought for him and was given to
him by Joyce. The defendant at the trial
proved that Hart had in the last two years
said to seven persons that the piano was
his grandfather's; that when Hart was 17
years old, Joyce mortgaged it, with Hart's
knowledge and in Hart's -presence, for a
debt of $75.00; that afterwards the $75.00
were repaid; that afterwards Joyce with
the knowledge and assent of Hart, then 19
years old, caused repairs costing $25.00 to
be made on the piano, Joyce calling the
piano his own in his conversation with the
repairer, which Hart heard. Under the
instructions ofthe Court, thejury rendered
a verdict for the defendant. A new trial
is asked for on the ground of error in these
instructions. I. The first instruction was
that the acts of Hart indicated by the testimony would estop him from denying the
ownership of Joyce. Hart being an infant
and the doctrine of estoppel in pais not being applicable to infants, he is therefore
not estopped by any of his declarations
and acts.-Sims v. Everhardt, 102 U. S.
313; Keen v. Coleman, 39 Pa. 299; Am. &
Eng. Ency. of Law, Vol. 7, p. 24. The law
imposes this disqualification from motives
of public policy and for the safety of those
regarded as weak and needing this proteetion.-Bodine v. Killeen, 53 N. Y. 96.
Eliminating the idea of infancy, Hart's
acts are not sufficient to estop him in any
case. To constitute estoppel three ingredients are necessary, namely, (a) misrep
resentation or wilful silence by one having
knowledge of the fact, (b) that the actor
having no means of information, was, by
the conduct of the other, induced to do
what otherwise he would not have done,
(c) that injury would ensue from a permission to allege the truth.-Commonwealth
v. Moltz, 10 Pa. 531; Eldred v. Hazlett's
Adm. 33 Pa. 307. With regard to the declarations madeby-1=art to the seven persons
that the piano was his grandfather's, none
of the elements necessary to constitute estoppel are present. The mortgaging of the
piano for a debt of $75.00 by Joyde with
Hart's knowledge and in his presence will
not estop Hart, for the reasonthat the$75.00
were afterwards repaid and hence no injury
would ensue from a permission to allege
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the truth If the piano had been given to
Hart. Concerning the repairs made to the
piano, costing $25.00, by Joyce with the
knowledge and assent of Hart, then 19
years old, and Joyce calling the piano his
own in his conversation with the repairer
which Hart heard, the doctrine of estoppel
approaches somewhat nearer than in any
of the foregoing circumstances. If Joyce
gave the piano to Hart, he had means of
information for it was with Hart's knowledge and assent that the repairs were
made and therefore he was not estopped.
If he did not give it to him, he suffered no
injury by Hart's silence, for it was a voluntary act of his own to have the repairs
made.
There was error, we think, in this instruction.
II. The jury was told that the effect of
the declarations to the.seven persons would
be to seriously weaken the present testimony of Hart, in contradiction of those
declarations, but thejurymustsay whether they were, or the testimony is, true. An
admission against interest is evidence
against a party and is to be taken a true.
Eldred v. Hazlett, 33 Pa. 307; Gabler's Appeal, 5 Cent. 314. Whether the effect would
be to seriously weaken the present testimony of Hart is a question for the jury to
decide and not the judge. The second instruction is therefore partly erronequs.
III. The third instruction that if the
piano was given to Hart, that it was in
Joyce's house and has always been there
and he and the other members of the family have always had access to it, the gift
passed the ownership and was irrevocable.
We think this instruction- correct. A gift
is a fact and like any other fact is a question for thejury.-Hunt v. Hunt, 119 Mass.
474; Hess v. Brown, 111 Pa. 124. Gifts entirely beneficial to the donee are presumed
to be accepted and when once accepted and
fully executed, they are irrevocable by the
donor. -Greenfield's Estate, 14 Pa. 489, 8
Am. &Eug. Ency. of Law, p. 1332. If the
gift in this case was executed, the fact that
the piano was in Joyce's house and-that
the family have always had access to it is
immaterial. For the errors indicated, the
verdict is hereby set aside and a rule for a
new trial granted.
IRVIN, J., dissents.

OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.

In the first trial of the suit of John Hart
against Alexander Joyce, a verdict was
rendered for the defendant. A new trial
was' allowed, because the court had instructed the jury that "the acts of Hart,
indicated by the testimony, would estop
him from denying the ownership of
Joyce." At the second trial the same
point was presented by Joyce and declined. A verdict having gone against him,
on which judgment was entered, he here
appeals because the court refused to affirm
that point. The sole question then, is,
whether any or all of the acts 6f Hart
estopped him from controverting the
ownership of Joyce.
(1) Hart's declarations within two years
before the trial, that the piano was Joyce's.
Former declarations by a witness, inconsistent with his present testimony, are
always receivable, not to prove the fact
averred therein, but to lessen the force of
his present testimony. When inconsistent statements are seen to emerge from the
same -person, the confidence in either is
necessarily impaired. If the witness is a
party, claiming to own a chattel, and
swearing that it is his, his former denials
of such ownership are admissible for this
reason. But they do not estop him. Even
a statement under oath, by X, in an issue
devisavit vel non, upon Z's will, that on a
certain day Z was insane, will not prevent
his subsequently claiming under a deed
from Z made on that day, Eichert v.
Schaffer, 161 Pa. 519. "Contradictory statements," say the court, "are not estoppels
without other explanatory circumstances,
and usually go to thejury merely on the
credibility of the witnesses." Id.
A2.) Joyce's mortgage of the piano for a
debt of $75 three years before the trial,
when Hart was seventeen years old, with
his knowledge and in his presence.
The failure to challenge Joyce's right to
make the mortgage, might, had Hart been
of age, have estopped him from subsequently denying it, as against the mortgagee. There has been no occasion thus
to deny it for the mortgage has been paid.
It is difficult to see how a denial which
under other circumstances might have
been a detriment if successful to the mortgagee, can be supposed to estop Hart, as re-
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spects Joyce, who could not possibly suffer
any injury from such denial on account
of that mortgage.
(3) Joyce, with the knowledge and assent of Hart, then 19 years old, caused repairs costing $25 to be made to the piano,
and stated to the repairer, in Hart's hearing, that the piano was his. Five years
before this occurrence, Hart's evidence
shows, the piano was given to him by
Joyce. Joyce must have been aware of
this gift. Its devolution upon Joyce is to
be made out, not by a contractual transfer,
a sale,. a gift, but by estoppel. We think
the court'below rightly concluded that the
facts did not estop Hart. (a) Hart was
an infant. An infant cannot be estopped,
Sims v. Everhardt, 102 U. S. 300; 7 Am. &
Eng. Encyc. Law, 24; Handy v. Canning,
166 Mass. 107. (b) There can be no estop.
pel unless the silence or representation
has deceived another, who, relying on the
belief thus engendered in his mind, so acts
that the present assertion of the fact would
injure him. Hart was simply silent when
his piano was being improved by Joyce.
Silence does not estop, Collins v. Houston,
138 Pa. 481, unless the circumstances require speech. Logan v. Gardner, 136 Pa.
588; Koch's estate, 148 Pa. 159. Hart was
under no duty to deny Joyce's ownership,
inasmuch as the facts then five years old,
on which Hart's ownership depended,
were as well known to Joyce as to himself.
The estopping conduct must have caused a
misapprehension, and the misapprehension must have led to the conduct of the
party claiming the benefit of the estoppel.
McKnight v. Bell, 135 Pa. .58; Kline v.
McCandless, 139 Pa. 222; Sensinger v.
Boyer, 153 Pa. 628; Powell's Appeal, 98 Pa.
403. The silence of Hart could not have
deceived Joyce as to the fact on which
their respective titles stood, and no misconception could have induced his procuring
the making of the repairs. He may have
intended, he doubtless did intend, to treat
the piano as his own, and his causing it to
be repaired possibly suggested to Hart that
he had such intention. But, surely an
owner is not estopped, because, when
another, intending to convert his goods,
causes their value to be increaged, he does
not proclaim his purpose to insist upon his
right.
Judgment affirmed.

WM1.TAUNTON vs. JOS. BENNETT.
Fraudulent debtor's act-Arrest -under
same-Money obtained under duress recoverable-Abuse of process.
Action in Trespass.
J. AuGusTus SCRrfrDT and JoHN
VINCENT, Jr., for plaintiff.

H.

The testimony discloses facts sufficient
to constitute duress. The $400 paid under
such duress, may therefore be recovered
back. Fiilman v. Ryon, 168 Pa. 484;
Mayer v. Walter,. 64 Pa. 285; Prough v.
Entricken, 11 Pa. 84: Taylor v. Jacques,
106 Mass. 291; 6 A. & h. Ency. 62; Work's
Appeal, 59 Pa. 444; Mortz v. Mitchell, 91
Pa. 114.
There was a malicious use of process.
Mayer v. Walter, supra; Hackett v. King,
6 Allen, 58; Prought v. Entricken, supra.
CLEON N.

BERNTHEIZEL

and

CLAUDE

L. ROTH for defendant.

The arrest was'lawful under the act of
12 July, 1842, P. & L. 8585. There was no
such duress as would allow the plaintiff to
recover the money paid. Stouffer v. Itatshaw 2 W. 167 ; Filman v. Ryon, 168 Pa.
484; tflaum v.1 McClintock, 130 Pa. 369;
Mayer v. Hoffman, 67 Wis. 279; Knapp
v. Hyde, 60 Barb. 80; Alexander v. Pierce,
10 N. H. 498; Eddy v. Herrin, 17 Me. 340.
There can be no recovery for false arrest.
The arrest was lawful. To recover for false
arrest, the proceedingmust be void or voidable-if voidable, must have been set aside
beford the institution of the suit. Mullen
v. Brown, 138 Mass. 114; Everett v. Henderson, 146 Mass. 89; Cooper v.' Hart, 147
Pa. 595.
There is no evidence in the ease that
there was a "1malicious abuse of process."
Neal v. Perry, 3 Clark 65.
Before

CODINGTON,

P.

J.;

HAMILTON

and FEIGHT, JJ.
CHARGE OF COURT.

CODINGTON, P. J.-The plaintiff in this

case was a merchant in Baltimore. He
failed in business, having among other
creditors a creditor in York, Pennsylvania,
who by false representations induced him
to come to this state and within the jurisdiction of this court.
The defendant promised to sign a composition deed, which he did not sign and
which he never intended to sign.
Defendant arrested the plaintiff as a
fraudulent debtor, and threatened to detain him unless he paid him the $400,
which plaintiff then paid. The plaintiff
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then sued the defendant for false arrest,
for malicious abuse of process, and for
fraudulently obtaining the $400.
The court is of the opinion that this arrest was made under the act of July 12
1842, entitled, "An act to abolish imprisonment for debt and to punish fraudulent
debtors."
It was well argued by the counsel for
the plaintiff that this arrest was of a criminal nature and that it was not warranted
by the statute.
The evidence in the case does not justify
such a conclusion and while the court is
not entirely free from doubt upon this
point, we feel inclined to hold that the
action was a civil one and properly brought
under the above named act. The evidence
is that defendant had originally intended
to arrest plaintiff as a "fradulent debtor.)
This is the only act bearing such title in
Pennsylvania, and as the authorities show,
is often resorted to in such cases. Berger
v. Smull & Sons, 89 P. S.302. The remedy
is by warrant and commitment. Neal v.
Perry, 3 Clark 65. In order that a creditor may take advantage of this act he
must have first obtained a judgment of a
court of record or commenced a suit.
It is not shown in this case that the defendant had taken either of these -prelimi*nary steps, but we think it fair to presume
that one of these requirements had been
complied with. The fact that plaintiffwas
not a -resident of Pennsylvania can not deprive the creditor of his statutory remedy,
and whether the fraud committed as
shown by the affidavit took place in or out
of the state can make no difference. Gos.
line v. Place, 32 P.S. 52.
We must presume that the act was complied with and that the proceedings were
regular. Williamson v. Fox, 38 P. S. 214;
R'y Co. v. Ramsey, 22 Wall, 322; Cromeline v. Brink, 29 P. S. 522. The court is
of the opinion, these proceedings being
regular on their face, that there was no
false arrest, nor was there a malicious
abuse of process, nor a fradulent obtaining
of the $400.
Had the plaintiff not been decoyed into
the jurisdiction of the court there could
have been no recovery, the proceedings
being strictly according to the statute.
That the plaintiff was so decoyed into the
jurisdiction there can be no doubt and this

for the sole purpose of causing his arrest.
Can anything lawful be founded upon
an action so wrongful and pernicious in itself? We are very clearly of the opinion
that no lawful action can lie where the
real cause of the action can so readily
be traced to the fraud and misrepresentations of the party seeking the intervention of such lawful action. Courts surely
were not created for the purpose of giving
sanction to one's wrongful deeds. Not to
permit a recovery would be contrary to
that great and.fundamental doctrine of the
law, "That no man shall be permitted to
take advantage of his own wrong."
To lay down a rule that a right can be
established through or by means of a
wrong, such as to permit a creditor by his
misrepresentations to .induce a debtor to
come within the jurisdiction of the court
for the purpose of serving a civil process
upon him, would be to subvert the ends of
justice and would be against the policy of
the law.
Fraud vitiates everything that it
touches. The law is well settled by Sharswood in Hevener v. Heist, 9 Phila. 274,
and by Van Dyke ih Williams v. Reed, 5
Dutch, (N. J.) 385. The plaintiff owed
the defendant a just debt and paid the
same under a threat of being detained and
possibly imprisoned as the act provides.
We believe that thi., money was paid as a
direct result of these unlawful proceedings
and therefore can be recovered back.
A case much relied upon for this conclusion, Deyo v. Jennison and another, 10
Allen, 410, in a similar proceeding not
only so held, but also held that lawful
proceedings based upon such a wrongful
action on the part of a creditor were not
only of no effect, but absolutely invalid
and void. Now, believing this to be the
true doctrine of the law, the court is of the
opinion that there can be a recovery for
false arrest and the duress used under such
arrest. Fillman v. Ryon, 168 P. S. 484.
We think that there can be no recovery on
the ground of malicious abuse of process
as defined by 168 P. S. 484, suipra. There
can be no doubt but that the last ground
is sufficient alone upon which to base a
recovery.
The court, for the reasons given, charges
the jury that they must find for the plaintiff the sum of $400 with interest from the
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or a malicious use or abuse of process.
When the opinion and the judgment of a
judicial officer are interposed between the
charge and the imprisonment, the ease is
not one of false imprisonment.-Webb's
Pollock, Torts, 266.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
The second countavers a malicious abuse
of process. As we have seen, the proceedThe grounds on which William Taunton
ing against Taunton was civil, and not
seeks to recover against Joseph Bennett are
criminal. "Generally speaking, it is not
(1) that being a resident of Baltimore and
a debtor to Bennett, he was decoyed by the an actionable wrong to institute civil proceedings without reasonable and probable
latter into York county, Pennsylvania, for
the purpose of being subjected to the juris- cause, even if malice be proved, for, in contemplation of law, the defendant who is
diction of the court of that county in a suit
which Bennett was intending to institute; unreasonably sued is sufficiently indemnified by ajudgment in his favor which gives
(2) that action was begun and the process
him his costs against the plaintiff."served upon him, and he was arrested on
a warrant as a fraudulent debtor and de- Webb's Pollock, Torts, 398; Cooley, Torts,
219 ; Mayer v. Walter, 64 Pa. 283 ; Eberly
tained, and (3) that in order to secure his
enlargement, he paid $400 to Bennett, the v. Rupp, 90 Pa. 259; Kramer v. Stock, 10
W. 115 ; Muldoon v. Rickey, 103 Pa. 113;
plaintiff in the action.
Norcrossv. Otis Brothers, 152 Pa. 481. But
The act of 12 July, 1842, 2 P. & L. 3585,
if in consequence of the action, the defendauthorizes the plaintiff in any action comant is deprived of property, e. g. being a
menced or conducted to judgment, to obtenant, he is deprived of his term in a
tain a warrant from the judge of the court
house, Mayer v. Walter, supra; or of his
in which the action is, for the arrest of the
liberty, Beech v. Wheeler, 30 Pa. 69; 24 Pa.
defendant when inter alia. the debt was
212; Emerson v. Cochran, 111 Pa. 619;
fraudulently contracted. This arrest is a
Cooley, Torts (2nd Ed.) 218, an action will
civil not a criminal proceeding, the warrant
being a substitute for the capias ad re- lie by the defendant against the plaintiff,
if the action was begun without probable
spondendum, allowed before the abolition
cause and with malice.
of imprisonment for debt.-Morch v. RauIt is unnecessary to draw the distinction
bitschek, 159 Pa. 559; Grieb v. Kuttner,
between the malicious use and the mali135 Pa. 281 ; Berger v. Smull, 39 Pa. 302;
cious abuse of legal process.-Mayer v.
Gosline's Case, 32 Pa. 526 ; Neal v. Perry,
Walter, 64 Pa. 283. The plaintiff avers a
4 Pa. L. J. 410; Commonwealth v. Daniel,
malicious abuse, but the erroneous adop4 Cl. 49; 6 Pa. L. J. 33P It is not alleged
tion of this denomination instead of that
that the affidavit of Bennett, on which the
of malicious use is innocuous. In the tech_
warrant was issued, contained any false
averments, or omitted any averment whose nical sense, we do not think that there was
existence therein was necessary to the law- a malicious use of process. There was a
real debt. The action was instituted to reful issue of the warrant. We must assume
cover it. The facts justificatory of an arthen that there existed a debt due to Bennett by Taunton and that this debt had rest existed. The action was ended, but
not by judgment for Taunton, but by his
been fraudulently contracted. The legitipayment of Bennett's claim. In Clark v.
macy of the arrest and detention is quesEverett, 2 Gr. 416, (cited in Mayer v. Waltioned solely because they were preceded
ter, 64 Pa. 283) for an action begun with arby the deception which inveigled Taunton
rest of the defendant, on a debt not yet
into York county.
payable, an action for malicious use of proThe first count of the declaration is upon
cess would not lie, because the defendant
a false imprisonment. The arrest was on
paid the debt.
a-warrant issued by a judge of the court of
The gravamen of Taunton's complaint is,
common pleas. The warrant was lawful.
It was a full authority to the sheriff. There not that he has been compelled by means
of a suit to pay a debt which he did not
was therefore no false imprisonment as
owe, but that he has been inveigled into
distinguished from a malicious prosecution
date of the payment of the said amount to
the defendant.
Appeal by defendant.
Error assigned, binding instructions as
above.
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York county, in order that the suit might
be brought against him.
The courts have had too frequent occasion to censure the service of process on
persons who were privileged from such service. The relief that they have afforded
has been to quash the writ or the service,
or to discharge the imprisoned defendant.
A summons served on a Pennsylvania witness in a New York court was set aside.Person v. Grier, 66 N. Y. 124; Seaver v.
Robinson, 3 Duer. 622. A resident of Brooklyn was enticed to New York, when a
libel suit was begun against him. The
summons was set aside.-Carpenter v.
Spooner, 2 Sandf. 717. The New Jersey
court set aside the service of a summons
on a New Yorker enticed into Jersey City.
Williams v. Reed, 5 Dutch. 385. If one is
brought into a state as a fugitive from justice, simply in order to serve a civil process
on him, the service will be quashed.-Williams v. Bacon, 10 Wend. 636. A resident
of Tioga county, Pennsylvania, was
brought to Philadelphia for trial on a criminal charge. On the day of his acquittal,
he was served with a summons. The
court set aside the service of the summons.
Addicks v. Bush, 1 Phila. 19.
If under similar circumstances a defendant is arrested, he will be discharged. A
party who as a witness is attending a
committee of the legislature to support a
claim against the state, will be discharged
on habeas corpus if he is arrested on a capias. EdwardThompson's Case, 122 Mass.
428. A witness who appeared before a
justice to make a deposition and was arrested immediately on leaving the justice's
office by A marshal, on process from the
Circuit Court of the United States, was
discharged on a rule from the Supreme
Courtof Pennsylvania, in which was pending the action in respect to which the deposition was being taken.-United States
v. Edme, 9 S. & R. 147. In Hurst's Case,
4 Dall. 360, the Circuit Court of the United
States ordered the sheriff of Philadelphia
to release from custody a New Yorker who
was in the city as a witness in that court
and whom he had taken under a capias
ad satisfaciendum, issued from the state
Supreme Court. A Parisian debtor was inteigled by letter into England, and was
then arrested on capiasfor the debt. The
pervice of the writ was set aside, because

the plaintiff could not gain an advantage
from his "own fraud." Stein v. Valkenhuysen, El. Bl. & El. 65.
A similar
disposition was made, when a Wisconsin citizen deceived by letter into
visiting Chicago was arrested on a suit for
$500. Wanzer v. Bright, 52 Ill. 35, and
the propriety of such a disposition was
tacitly recognized in Cook v. Brown, 125
Mass. 503. In Commonwealthv. Daniels,
6 Pa. L. J. 330, 4 (1. 49, a Kentuckian was
brought into Philadelphia on a requisition
and while awaiting trial was arrested
under the act of 12 July, 1842, the act
under which Taunton was arrested. The
court of quarter sessions would have discharged him, had he been attending as a
witness or a party in a civil suit, or had
the criminal prosecution been a mere ruse
for the purpose of bringing him into the
state. Moyer v. Place, 13 Pa. C. C. 163;
Hvener v. Heist, 9 Phila. 274; 2 Br. Dig.
2052; Vide, 1 Br. Pr. -236.
There can be no doubt that had Taunton
applied to the common pleas, it would not
only have discharged him from arrest,
but would have set aside the service of the
summons. We do not think he has lost
all right to redress for the wrong done
him. In Cook v. Brown, 125 Mass. 503, a
resident of Rhode Island was enticed into
Massachusetts, and while there a summons
was served upon him. He did not ask the
court to set aside the service, but went to
trial on the merits and ajudgment was
rendered against him for a portion of the
plaintiff's claim. In a subsequent suit
against the plaintiff, he was permitted to
recover the expense of travel and the loss
arising from the interruption of his business. Compare Cooley, Torts 221 (2d ed.).
In Wanzer v. Bright, 52 Ill. 35, a resident
of Wisconsin was lured into Chicago by a
letter, and was then arrested in a suit for
$500. He applied for and obtained his
discharge because of the fraud practiced
on him. In an action then begun by him
against his creditor-to whom he had paid
nothing- he recovered damages, (even
punitive because he instituted a second
action and caused a second arrest after the
discharge in the first action). Compare
contra, Smith v. Jones, 76 Me. 138. We
think then that Taunton may recover for
the wrongful act of Bennett in enticing
him into Pennsylvania. The payment of
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$400 to secure his discharge cannot be reAs the plaintiff has been permitted by
garded as a condonation of the wrong.
the court below to recover only $400 with
Taunton claims to recover the $400 paid
interest, he might probably have justly
by him, as paid under duress. The act of
complained. The error, if any has been
Bennett in enticing Taunton into York
committed, was to the advantage of the
county, and in suing him, was wrongful.
appellant.
The procurement of the warrant for arrest
Judgment affirmed.
and of the arrest, was also wrongful.
The object of it was to compel the payment of the $400; and this object was ef- FRANK ROAN vs. EBENEZER LOGAN.
fectuated when the $400 was paid. The
Liability of innkeeper for loss of proppayment was under duress. An assignment of a legacy coerced by an arrest ef- erty of guest-asinsurer--asbaileefor hire
fected by means of a criminal charge was -Guest, defined- When goods are infra
voidable for duress, Work's Appeal, 59 Pa. ho6voitium.
444. A prosecution for embezzlement beCase stated.
ing employed to compel payment of a sum
WARREN H. SmocK and FRED. C. MILof money in excess of what was owed, the LER for plaintiff.
money could be recovered back, although
1. Plaintiff was a guest. Clute v. Wigthere was probable cause for the prosecu- gins, 14 Johns. 175; Calye's Case, 8 Coke
32; A. & E. Ency. Vol. II, pp. 13, 27. Inntion and consequently no ground for an
keeper is an insurer of guest's property.
action for malicious prosecution, Fillman
Hulett v. Swift, 33 N. Y. 570; Wilkins v..
v. Ryon, 168 Pa. 484. In Clark v. Woods, Earle, 44 N. Y. 172; Shultz v. Woll, 134
2 Exch. 395, A was arrested for non-pay- Pa. 262; Houser v. Tully, 62 Pa. 93; Walsh
Porterfield, 87 Pa. 376. Masonv. Thompment of poor-rates and costs. There was v.
son, 9 Pick. 280; Richardson v. Smith, 8
authority to arrest for the rates, but not
Barn. and Cres. 9.
2. Innkeeper is liable as abailee for hire:
for the costs. A paid both the rates and
costs to escape the imprisonment. Ile was Clute v. Wiggins, supra; Mowers v. Fettrers, 61 N. Y. 34; Hawley v. Smith, 25
permitted to recover all back because it
Wend. 642; A. & . Ency. Vol. IIpp. 74,
had been paid under duress. A mortgagee
79. The burden of proof is on the defendof a smack in order to compel the sur- ant to show that he exercised ordinary
render to him of the register and the cer- care. Logan v. Matthews 6 Pa. 417;
v. The Phila. Steam Propeller Co.,
tificate of registration, (he had no right to Shenk
60 Pa. 109; Safe Deposit Co. v. Pollock, 85
them) began assumpsit for the debt before Pa. 391; Woodruff v. Painter, 150 Pa. 91;
it was due, and upon a capias caused the Hoeveller v. Myers, 158 Pa. 461.
mortgagor's arrest. In order to secure his
JACKSON 0. HA.As and ART UR M. DEliberation, the latter surrendered the regis- VALL for defendant.
An innkeeper is only an insurer when
ter and certificate. Subsequently he paid
the goods in his possession are infra hosthe costs and repaid the money borrowed pitium.
Much less is he liable where the
on the mortgage. He was permitted to re- plaintiff requested his horse to be put into
cover damages for the deprivation of his the field. Calye's Case, 1 Smith's L. C.
246; Mowers v. Fettrers, 61 N. Y. 34;
property, Grainger v. Hill, 4 Bing. N. C.
v. Sinith, 25 Wend. 643; Piper v.
A, 212. In Sweetv. Kimball, 166 Mass. 332, Hawley
Manny, 21 Wend. 284; Eldridge v. Hill,
a resident of Providence, Rhode Island, in- 97 U. S. 92.
The defendant is not liable as a bailee for
debted to B, a Bostonian, was induced by
hire, it not having been shown that he
B to visit Boston in order that he might
failed to exercise ordinary care.
procure the execution of a composition
deed by other Boston creditors. On A's
OPINION OF COURT.
arrival, B caused his arrest on a capias
Frank Roan, travelling on. horseback,
for the debt, and A paid B $700 to secure stopped at the hotel of Ebenezer Logan for
his liberation. In a subsequent suit he
dinner. The season being spring, Roan
was allowed to recover back the $700. "It
requested Logan to turn his horse into an
requires no innovation," says Holmes, J.,
enclosed field for pasture during the noon
"to decide that money paid to befree from
hours. Logan did so. Whenthe horse
it (the imprisonment) may be recovered
was sought, he could not be found. The
back."
value of the horse was $209.
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The liability of Logan is placed by the 560; for a chaise and harness, Mason v.
plaintiff on either of two grounds: on his Thompson, 9 Pick. 280; for a flock of 700
being an innkeeper, and on his being a sheep, Hawley v. Smith, 25 Wend. 642;
bailee for hire. The responsibility of the for a tub of butter, Piper v. Manny, 21
former is severer than that of the latter. Wend. 282; for a load of wheat and barley
The innkeeper is an insurer of the goods in a sleigh, Clute v. Wiggins, 14 Johns.
of the guest, except as against such losses 175; fbr cows, Hilton v. Adams, 71 Me. 19;
as are caused by the act of God, or a horse, Hulett v. Swift, 33 N. Y. 571; Rusthe public enemy, or by the conduct of sell v. Fagan, 6 Cent. 865; Calye's Case, 8
the guest himself, or of his servant or the Coke 32; Cf. Ingallsbee v. Wood, 33 N. Y.
companion whomi he brings with him. 577.
The horse was put into the pasture.
Edwards, Bailments, 337; Shultz v. Wall,
134 Pa. 262; Walsh v. Porterfield, 87 Pa. Many cases hold that the innkeeper is li376; Houser v. Tully, 62 Pa. 92; Hulett v.
able only for articles placed infra hospitSwift, 33 N. Y. 571; Piper v. Manny, 21 lum, within the inn or its curtilage. HawWend. 282; Mason v. Thompson, 9 Pick. leyv. Smith, 25 Wend. 642. Beinginfrahos280; Hilton v. Adams, 71 Me. 19. His pitium has received a somewhat broad infreedom from negligence does not exoner- terpretation. Cows put into the inn yard
in which was a barn, and in which the
ate him. On the other hand, the bailee
for hire is liable for the loss of or injury to
innkeeper kept his own cows, Hilton v.
goods deposited with him, only when such
Adams, 71 Mle 19; a chaise and harness
loss or injury is attributable to his want of put under a shed in an enclosed yard,
ordinary care. Woodruff v. Painter, 150
where the innkeeper usually put his guests'
Pa. 91 ; Ingallsbee v. Wood, 33 N. Y. 577.
chaises and harness, Mason v. Thompson,
The peculiar liability of an innkeeper
9 Pick. 280; a sleigh loaded with grain put
attaches only when one has become his into the wagon-house where it was usual
guest. Hall v. Pike, 100 Mass. 495; Infor the innkeeper to receive such loads,
gallsbee v. Wood, 33 N. Y. 577; Grinnell
Clute v. Wiggins, 14 Johns. 175; a sleigh
v. Cook, 3 Hill, 485; Strauss v. County loaded with tubs of butter placed, as such
Hotel, 12 Q. B. Div. 27. Was Roan such
things usually were, in an unenclosed yard
a guest? He stopped to obtain dinner and across the road from the house, Piper v.
food for his horse. He did not lodge in
Manny, 21 Wend. 282, were infra hospitium. On the other hand, sheep, Hawley
the house over night. He is, neverthelesS,
a guest. To stop for the purpose of obtain- v. Smith, 25 Wend. 642; or a horse, Calye's
ing drink makes one a guest. Bennett v. Case, 8 Coke 32; put into a pasture, where
Mellor, 5 T. R. 273; McDonald v. Edger- they would not have been put but for the
ton, 5 Barb. 560. Causing one's horse to
request of the guest, were not infra hosbe stabled at the inn, while one sojourns pitium, and, in the former case, for injury
to the sheep from eating laurel, and in the
elsewhere, makes him, as to the horse, a
guest. Russell v. Fagan, 6 Cent. R. 864; latter for the disappearance of the horse,
Mason v.. Thompson, 9 Pick. 280, [contra the innkeeper was not responsible. Roan
Ingallsbee v. Wood, supra] and one is a requested Logan to turn the horse out to
guest who takes meals in the inn, though pasture in the field. It does not appear
he lodges elsewhere. Willing v. Potter,
that into this field were ordinarily put
35 Conn. 183. As Roan stopped to procure the horses of guests. We therefore think
refreshment both for himself and his horse,
that the horse was not so within the inn,
he was a guest.
had not been so disposed of by Logan on
The loss was of the horse. Does the li- his own initiative, as to attach to him the
ability of the innkeeper extend to horses.? innkeeper's special responsibility.
He is liable for money; Shultz v. Wall,
But the inn-keeper, though the circum134 Pa. 262; Sneider v. Geiss, 1 Y. 34; or
stances of the bailinent do not impose on
bank notes; Towson v. Havre-de-Grace
him the peculiarly severe liability of that
relation, may become the bailee of goods
Bank, 6 H. & . 10 ; for any personalty that
accompanies the guest, and which he un- and as such be liable for a loss arisdertakes to receive and shelter; e.g. for an
ing through his negligence. Ingallsbee v.
overcoat; McDonald v. Edgerton, 5 Barb. Wood, 33 N. Y. 577; Mowers v. Fehrers,
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61 N. Y. 34. Logan was such a bailee.
The horse was received by him upon
his premises and was put out by him to
pasture. He was bound to exercise towards it ordinary care. Edward's Bailments, 236. Roan's horse was put into an
enclosed field. When, a few hours afterwards, he was sought for he was not found.
Was he stolen? If so, by the defendant?
Or by the defendant's servants? Or by
his guests? Or by strangers? Did he escape by a gate carelessly left open? Or
through a break in the fence whose existence would stamp as negligent the act of
putting the horse in the field? Or did the
horse leap the fence and thus, without
carelessness on the part of Logan, effect
his flight? We have no explanation of
the disappearance of the horse. Logan is
liable only for the want of that care which
a bailee for hire should exhibit. But on
whom is the burdei of the proof? Must
Roan establish the want of care, or must
Logan at least primafacie repel the hypothesis that he has been negligent? The
principle enunciated by Heydrick, J., in
Woodruff v. Painter, 150 Pa. 91, is we
think applicable. "A bailee who fails to
give any such explanation of his neglect
to restore the property entrusted to him,
as will enable the bailor to test his good
faith, ought to be held to proof that he
has exercised ordinary diligence in the
care of it." In that case a clothes merchant was bound to account for the disappearance of a watch from a drawer into
which it was placed, when taken from a
customer while he was trying on clothes.
The same principle has been extended to
a warehouseman, Hoeveller v. Myers, 158
Pa. 461; to a private carrier, Shenk v.
Philadelphia Steam Propeller Co., 60 Pa.
109; Verner v. Sweitzer, 32 Pa. 208; to
the hirer of a buggy, Logan v. Matthews,
6 Pa. 417; and to the depositary with
whom bonds were left for safe keeping,
Safe Deposit Co. v. Pollock, 85 Pa, 391.
Judgment therefore will be entered on
the case stated against the defendant and
for the plaintiff in the sum of $200 with
interest from April 29th, '96, the time of
the loss of the horse.

HEPWORTH AXM

vs. JAMES KENT.

Effect on lien of first mortgageby sale of
property on subsequent jud.qmens-Bond
accompanying mortgage--Entry of judgment on bond-Sheriff's sale on such
judgment-Assignee's sale.
Ejectment.
ADA
HERMAN and RoiBERT STUCKER
for plaintiff.
1. Liens of certain mort-ages will not
be destroyed by any judicia sale.-Acts of
April 9, 1830; March 23, 1867; March 22,
1887; May 19, 1893; Penn. Square Building
Asso's. Appeal, 81.1 Pa. 330; Helfrick v.
Weaver, 61 Pa. 385; 2 Trickett on Liens,
820, 821; 3 Trickett on Liens, 216; Wertz's
Appeal, 65 Pa. 306; Com. v. Wilson, 34 Pa.
63; Miller v. Fluck, 8 C. C. 585; Ruth's
Appeal, 20 W. N. C. 375.
2. The mortgage and the bond accompanying it are regarded as one instrument,
and the date of the lien of the latter relates back to the date of the lien of the
former.-Miller v. Fluck, supra; Com. v.
Wilson. supra; Hartz v. Woods, 8 Pa.
471.
G. H. MOYER and S. B. HARE: for defendant.
1. The lien of the mortgage is divested.
-Loomis' Appeal, 22 Pa. 317; Zeigler's
Appeal, 11 Casey 173; Pierce v. Patter,
7 Watts, 475; Berger v. Heister, 6 Wh.
210; Clark v. Stanley, 10 §Pa. 472; West
Branch Bank v. Chester, 1 Jones 282.
2. Hinkle having no title to the land
when the judgment was entered against
him, the lien of the judgment could not
a!ttach to the land, and a sale of the land
on such judgment conveyed no title.
Before SOmERVILLE, P. J.; KISER and
SMALL, JJ.
OPINION OF COURT.
KISER, J.-John Hinkle, owning a
farm, made a mortgage of it to Isaiah
Jones for $3,000. The mortgage was accompanied by a bond with warrant of attorney to confess judgment. Subsequently
contracting heavy debts, for some of which
judgments were obtained, Hinkle made
an assignment for the benefit of creditors.
Under an order of court, the assignee sold
the farm, James Kent becoming the purchaser. The proceeds were applied to the
satisfaction of the liens later than the
mortgage. Jones now entered judgment
on his bond, a ft. fa. and vend. ex. were
issued, and the sheriff sold the farm in
question to Hepworth Ames. Kent refusing to give up the possession, Ames
now brings this ejectment.
That the lien of the mortgage to Jones
was not divested by the sale of the farm
by Iinkle's assignee, is we think clear.
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dates of the lien of the latter. One of the
The act of 19th May, 1893, 1, P. & L.
1585. very plainly declare, that when the early cases recognizing this principle is
the one of McCall v. Lenox, 9 S. & R. 302.
lien of a mortgage upon real estate is prior
In that case, Justice Gibson dissented
to all other liens upon the same property,
the lien of such mortgage shall not be de- most strongly from the decision of the
feated or destroyed by any judicial or other
court, contending that the instruments
are not the same in contemplation of law,
sale whatsoever. See also acts of 6th
and that the liens of the same should be
April, 1830, P. L. 293; 23rd March, 1867,
P. & L. 1584; 22nd March, 1887, P. & i.
kept distinct. The decision of the court
in that case has, however, been since recog1585, under which it was held that such
nized as the correct rule. Bury v. Lieber,
was the case, in sheriff and Orphans'
Court sales. Com. v. Wilson, 34 Pa. 63; Hel- 5 Pa. 431; 1 Trickett on Liens, 176.
No one is injured by Jones' election to
frick v. Weaver, 61 Pa. 385; Wertz's Approceed on his judgment. The land in the
peal. 65 Pa. 306; Miller v. Fluck, 8 Pa. C.
hands of Kent was subject to the payment
C. 585; Penn. Square'B'ld'g. Asso's. Apof the debt, and he might have made any
peal, 811 Pa. 330; 3 Trickett on Liens,
i69. The rule, under these acts, in a defense to the proceeding employed that
sale by an assignee for creditors is we he might have made against a proceeding
on the mortgage. The courts have seen
think the same. The act of 17th February
1876, P. & L. 200, however makes especial
fit not to throw unnecessary difficulties in
reference to sales by assignees for the bene- the way of creditors.
Judgment is therefore entered for the
fit of creditors and leaves no room for
plaintiff.
doubt that the mortgage followed the land.
Had then the land been sold on a scire
Appeal by defendant.
facia-3 on the mortgage, the purchaser
Error Assigned, entry of judgment as
would have taken a good title. But Jones
above.
did not proceed on his mortgage, but enOPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
tered judgment upon the warrant of atThe mortgage of Hinkle to Jones was
torney that accompanied the bond, and
"ipriorto all other liens" on his farm. The
by means of it, the land was sold. Did
sale of the farm by the assignee did not
this sale convey a good title?
discharge it. Act March 23, 1867, 1 P. &
The lien of a judgment ordinarily runs
only from its date; and not having been en- L. 1584; Act 'March 22, 1887, 1 P. & L.
1585; Act May 19, 1893, 1 P. & L. 1585.
tered against Hinkle until after he had
assigned the land to his assignee, and the The act of February 17, 1876, 1 P. & L.
200, under which the sale took place, exassignee had in turn sold it to Kent, how
pressly preserves the lien of such a mortcan the lien of the judgment attach? This
gage. Kent then acquired the farm, subas a plain proposition would be impossible.
But in the case at bar, a mortgage was jecL to the mortgage, and Jones, the mortgiven to secure the bond and the lien of gagee, could, having sued out a scire
the mortgage attached before Hinkel con- facias upon it and recovered a judgment,
veyed to his assignee. In such case, it have sold the farm as the means of realizing his debt. This, however, he did not
has been held that the date of the lien of
the judgment relates back to the date of do.
Subsequently to the assignee's sale to
the lien of the mortgage. Hartz v. Woods,
8 Pa. 471; Com. v. Wilson, supra; De- Kent, Jones caused a judgment to be enWitt's Appeal, 76 Pa. 283. The bond and tered, not upon the mortgage, but upon
the mortgage having been given for the the warrant of attorney that accompanied
same debt, are in contemplation of law the bond. On this judgment the ft. fa.
and the vend. ex. issued upon which the
one instrument, and form one security.
It gives the mortgagee the choice of reme- sale to Ames took place. The question
dies, as to whether to proceed by sci. fa. then is whether this sale, on a judgment
on the mortgageor byfi. fa. and vend. ex. that was not in existence when the ason the jugment on the bond. The mort- signment was made, or when the asgage is givbn to secure the bond, and the signee's sale occurred, has divested the
date of the lien of the former controls the estate of Kent, Ordinarily such a sale
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could produce no such consequence. Land
which has ceased to be the defendant's
before a personal judgment has been recovered against him, cannot be sold to satisfy it. If this sale to Ames has extinguished Kent's interest, it has done so
simply because of the peculiar relation between the judgment and the mortgage.
Is the same interest vendible on such a
judgment that would have been vendible
on the mortgage? In McCall v. Lenox,
9 S. & R. 302, between the recording of
the mortgage and the entry of the judgment on an accompanying bond, a lease
for two years was executed. Normally
the lien of the judgment would have attached only to the reversion. The sale on
it, however, divested the intervening
lease, as would a sale on the mortgage itself. In Hartz v. Woods, 8 Pa. 471, there
were (1) a mortgage, (2) a conveyance by
the mortgagor, (3) ajudgment on one of the
mortgage bonds. A a'e on thejuldgment
divested the mortgage; i. e. produced the
same effects as a sale on the mortgage.
The sale on the mortgage would, it need not
be repeated, divest the estate of the mortgagor's grantee. An analogous principle
is found in Tyrone, etc., R. R. Co. v.
Jones, 79 Pa. 60; where there were (1) a
debt, made a lien by statute; (2) asheriffls
sale on a later lien; (3) a judgment on (1)
and a sale thereon. This sale divested the
estate acquired by the sale on (2). See 1
Liens, 212. It is evident then, that a sale
on a judgment on a bond for which the
mortgage is a security, will divest all the
estates that a sale on the mortgage would
divest although the judgment is not entered until the mortgagor has parted with
the equity of redemption. The conclusion reached by the learned Court of Common Pleas is therefore correct, and judgment is affirmed.

Second marriage void.-Clark's Appeal;
173 Pa. 431; Parker's Appeal, 44 Pa. 309,
Thomas v. Thomas, 124 Pa. 646.
Illegitimate children cannot take under
will unless intention is shown clearly in
the will. -2 Jarman on Wills, 786; A. & E.
Ency. Vol. 2, 142; Gaines v. Hennen, 65
U. S. 553; Godfrey v. Davis, 6 Ves. 43.
Where bequest is capable of two meanings, the one which conforms to the law
of descent will be adopted.-Stehman's
Appeal, 45 Pa. 398; Harwity v. Norris,
60
Pa. 261; A. & E. Ency., Vol. 3, p. 200 .
"Son" means legitimate son.-Appel v.
Byers, 98 Pa. 479.
WALTER G. TREiBLY and CHAS. E.
HORN for defendant.

Circumstances at the time of making
the will control the intention.-Hulton's
Appeal, 104 Pa. 359. Previous professions
of testator indicate a design togive property in a particular way.-Vernor v.
Henry, 3 W. 385; Bromfield v. Bromfield, 12 Pa. 136. It is clearly shown that
the illegitimate son was intended. The
signature of the will indicates that she
intended Shatto to take.
Before BIDDLE,
RYAN, JJ.

P. J.;

BEISTEL,

and

OPINION OF COURT.

BEISTEL. J.-A woman once married to
Henry Beale and having a son, Joseph
Beale, living in England, separated from
them and came to Pennsylvania. After
8 years she married Francis Shatto, with
whom she lived for twenty eight years,
having u son, Francis Shatto. She had no
communication with Beale during the
separation. She constantly called Shatto
her husband and son, as did her neighbors
and friends and also they themselves.
Dying, she left personal property and a
house. By her will she directed that,
"my beloved husband shall have one-half
of all my personal property. The .rest
thereof together with my house I give to
my dear son, his heirs and assigns." Signed
Rebecca Shatto. Henry Beale is dead,
but Joseph, as son, claims as devisee.
It being an undoubted principle in
JOS. BEALE vs. FRANCIS SHATTO.
Pennsylvania that a married woman can
alien by bequest or devise the same as a
Latent ambiguity in a will-Admissibil- feme sole, with the exception that she
ity of extraneous evidence and'its effect cannot defeat her husband's right of curtesy, it follows that she could devise to a
-Intention to give to illegitimateson.
legitimate or illegitimate son, husband or
to any one she saw fit so to do. The only
Case stated.
question, therefore, confronting us is, did
MARTIN R. HERR and CHAS. E. DANshe give her property to Francis Shatto,
IELS for plaintiff.
Jr., her illegitimate son?
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A bequest to childrenprimafacie means
legitimate children, yet illegitimate children may take if sufficiently designated.
In England the rule was well understood
that an illegitimate child, in order to take
under a will, must be very plainly designated-must be pointed out so that there
can be no doubt as to whom the testator
meant. In Wilkinson v. Adams, 1 V. &
B. 461-468, Lord Eldon said, "The question comes round to this, whether it is
possible to say he could mean, at a time of
making that will, any but illegitimate
children."
In 5 Ves. 530, Cartwright v. Vawdry,
the testator left surviving, his wife and
four daughters by her. The eldest daughter was born before the marriage of her
parents. She was always considered a
legitimate child by her sisters and all who
knew her. The testator in his will devised his property to his children. In the
opinion of the court Lord Loughborough
said, "This is a very unfortunate case. I
have no doubt of the intention; but how
can I possibly put upon the will the construction the plaintiff desired when there
are lawful children. * 0 * * It is impossible ina court of justice to hold, that
an illegitimate child can take equally
with lawful children, upon a devise to
children."
We find no American decision of authority upholding this strict rule, but
they rather give effect to the testator's intention when that is ascertained. In the
case of Appel v. Byers, 98 Pa. 479, the
jury returned the following special verdict: We find that the testator, Peter
Byers, deceased, died leaving two nephews, one Philip, the son of Martin (legitimate); another Philip, the son of Louis
(illegitimate). We find that the nephew
intended by the testator to inherit was
Philip, the illegitimate nephew, the son of
Louis, and this from evidence aliunde the
will and not from the will itself. Judgment was entered by the court below for
the illegitimate nephew. The Supreme
court reversed the court below on the
ground that th6 illegitimate nephew did
not fufill the description in the will-that
he was no nephew in law.
This woman who signed her will, Rebecca Shatto lived with her husband and
son Shatto, for twenty-eight years. She

had no communication from her husband
and son Beale for thirty-six years. When
she bequeathed to her "beloved husband"
half her personal property it seems plain
she means Shatto, and when by the same
will immediately following the bequest
to her "beloved husband" she devises to
her "dear son" without any further description the remainder of her property, it
seems clear that she means Francis Shatto,
Jr., as the object of her bounty. It could
not be contended with much force that
Mrs. Shatto would give to her beloved
husband Shatto and immediately following such gift in the same will to her son
Beale.
We therefore decree judgment for the
defendant.
Appeal by plaintiff.
Error assigned, entry of judgment as
above.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.

Rebecca Shatto was not the lawful wife
of Francis Shatto. She had been married
to Henry Beale, and Beale was not dead
when the marriage to Shatto took place.
Eight years had then elapsed since her
separation from Beale, but the conditions
under which the presumption of death .in
seven years arises do not here exist. It
was not Beale but his wife that left the
former domicile. Whether she had heard
from him during the eight years we do
not know. Rebecca's son, Francis Shatto,
was illegitimate. Her will gave one-half
of her personalty and her house, to "my
dear son." Did she intend the legitimate
or the illegitimate son ? In the absence of
contrary intimation in the will, and of
evidence dehors, she would be understood
to mean by "son" her legitimate son.
The English rule is thus stated by Jarman, "if, by possibility, legitimate children alone would have satisfied the terms
of such gift, illegitimate children cannot
take, though children, legitimate or illegitimate, may take concurrently under such
agift, if the terms of it cannot be satisfied
without including the latter." 2 Wills
250, [Ed of 1881]. In Ellis v. Houston,
10 Ch. D. 236, an excellent review of the
English decisions is given by Vice-Chancellor Malins, whose conclusion is, that
unless the will itself reveals the intent
that illegitimates shall take the legacy,
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they will be excluded therefrom if there
are legitimate children, however clearly
extraneous evidence shows such to have
in fact been the intent of the testator.
"Now," says the V. C., "I may say I believe the law is firmly settled, and was
settled long before any of us came into existence, that where you have a bequest of
property to a class of persons, children,
nephews or nieces, or any class you like'I give to my children,' 'I give to my
nephews and nieces,' or 'I give to my
brothers and sisters,' and you find in the
class designated, legitimate membersyou never can admit illegitimate persons
to share with them. Therefore in all
cases where a man says, 'I give to A for
life, and after his decease, to his children,'
if there are legitimate children to be
found, answerihg that description, you
cannot go any further; and you cannot
admit illegitimate children to share with
them." The extrinsic evidence in the case
before him, admitted, he thought, "of no
doubt whatever," that illegitimate were
intefded to share wifh legitimate children,
yet he confined the bequest to the latter.
In Cartwright v. Vawdry, 5 Ves. 530, Lord
Chancellor Loughborough said, "This is a
very unfortunate case. I have no doubt of
the intention; but how can I possibly put
upon the will the construction the plaintiff desires, when there are lawful children? The family will act very honorably and conscientiously by giving way to
the disposition which is stated, but, it is
impossible in a court of justice to hold
that an illegitimate child can take
equally with lawful children upon a devise to children."
Vide 3 Am. & Eng.
Encyc. Law, 230.
A different rule has been recognized in
New York. Henry Shields was married
in 1833 to Jane Valentine. A daughter
was born in 1840, and a son in 1848. In
Nov. 1848, not having been previously divorced, Shields was married to another
woman, Catharine. With Catharine he
lived until his death in 1877, leaving eight
children by her to survive him. Jane,
the legitimate wife, recovered her dower
in his lands. His will contained a bequest, after the death of his widow, to
"my then surviving children."
The
claim of the two children by Jane, to
share in this bequest was rejected. The cir-

cumstance that the will spoke of "my beloved wife Catharine," and constituted
"my said wife guardian of my minor children"; that Jane had, at the testator's death,
been abandoned 44 years, that a marriage had taken place with Catharine followed by cohabitation, induced the court
to say, "It is also quite clear that the children which are spoken of in the same
will, are and were the children of the testator and Catharine Shields. It is evident
that those only were referred to and none
others have any right whatever in that
connection. It would be inconsistent with
the whole object and tenor of the will, to
hold that the testator intended to include
children of another female, who was not
named and whom he did not recognize as
his wife." Gelston v. Shields, 78 N. Y.
275.
The English rule was recognized and applied in Appel v. Byer.s, 98 Pa. 479. The
testator said "my nephew, Philip Byers,
shall have and hold, after the death of
my wife, all my real and personal estate."
One of his brothers had a legitimate son,
and another an illegitimate son, named
Philip. The jury in a special verdict,
found that the illegitimate nephew was
intended, but unfortunately, on what evidence, does not appear. The judgment
entered on the verdict was reversed by the
Supreme Court; for the reason in substance,
that there is no nephew but a legitimate
nephew; and therefore there was no ambiguity demanding resolution. The English cases supra are cited, and the remark
is made that "no American authority was
cited which maintains the right of illegitimate persons to share with those who
are legitimate when the latter are found,
and strictly ana fully answer the description in the written will." But, Gelston
v. Shields, 73 N. Y. 275, had been decided
two years before.
To state fully why we are unable to regard Appel v. Byers, decisive of the present case, would be unduly to extend this
opinion. The aim of interpretation ought
to be to ascertain the testator's intention.
The testatrix subscribed the will Rebecca
Shatto. She thus significantly claimed to
be the wife of Francis Shatto. With her
son by him, she had lived as mother ever
since he was born. The bequest to "my
beloved husband," which must be un-
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derstood to be to Francis Shatto, Sr.,
Pastene v. Bonini, 166 Mass. 85; Gains v.
Rouse, 5 Mann. G. & S. 422; Hardy v.
Smith, 136 Mass. 328, is immediately followed by the devise to "my dear son."
She had had no communication with
Henry Beale or Joseph Beale for 36 years,
having, the more definitely to abandon
them, left them in England while she came
to the United States. She called the Shattos, they called themselves, and their
friends and neighbors called them, her husband and son. We think the inference from
the indicia in the will and from the facts
revealed by the extraneous evidence irresistible, that the "dear son" contemplated
was Francis Shatto. The Orphans' Court,
in making distribution of the personal
estate of the testatrix, has reached the
same conclusion.
Decree affirmed, and appeal dismissed
at the cost of appellant.

ALEXANDER ALVORD
LANE.

s. RICHARD

Specific performance-Irrevocability of
option under seal without actual consideration.
Bill in Equity.
CHARLES S. SHALiERS and SYLVESTER
B. SADLER for the complainant.
Agreement under seal is irrevocable.McMillen v. Ames, 33 Minn. 257; Yard v.
Patton, 13 Pa. 285; Candor & Henderson's
Appeal, 27 Pa. 120. There was no need of
tender, the vendor having declined to sell
to Lane.-Hampton v. Speckenagle, 9 S,
&R. 212. Specific performance not refused
on ground- of adequate remedy at law.Corson v. Mulvany, 49 Pa. 91. Nor on
ground that options are not mutual for they
are. Corson v. Mulvany, 49 Pa. 99; Smith &
Fleek's Appeal, 9 Pa. 40; Yerkes v. Richards, 153 Pa. 650. There is no such "failure" of consideration as will defeat specific
performance. Must be distinguished from
"want" of consideration.-Meek v. Frantz,
171 Pa. 638. Seal imports consideration.Hosler v. Hursh, 151 Pa. 422. One who
makes a writing underseal is estopped from
denyin consideration. -Weaver v. Burr,
31 W. 4a. 736. Consideration can only be
attacked in writing under seal when fraud
is claimed.-Burkholder v. Plank, 69 Pa.
233. Specific performance will not be defeated on ground of inadequacy of price.Davidson v. Little, 10 Harris, 251. If specific performance cannot be granted, damages will be given in lieu thereof.-Fessler's

Appeal, 75 Pa. 483. Specific performance
will be granted in case of options.-Corson
v. Mulvany, 49 Pa. 91; Kerr v. Day, 14 Pa.
112.
FRANK H. STROUSS and H. H. HESS for
the defendant cited:
Selon v. Slade, 7 Ves. 2.5; Paine v. Meller, 6 Ves. 352; Hatch v. Cob, 4 Johns Ch.
,59; Dickinson v. Dodds, 2 Ch. Div. 463;B.
& Al. R. R. v. Bartlett, 3 Cush. 224; Corson
v. Mulvany, 49 Pa. 88; Schmertz v. Shreeve,
62 Pa. 457; Heurtt's Appeal, 88 Pa. 55;
Koch's Appeal, 93 Pa. 434; Smaltz's Appeal, 99 Pa. 312; Building Ass'n v. Hull,
135 Pa. 565; Hosler v. Hursh, 151 Pa. 415;
Maguire v. Heraty, 163 Pa. 381; Bosshardt
v. 'rescent Oil Co., 171 Pa. 109.
Before WILLIAMS, P. J., MACKEY and
MILLER, JJ.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

WILLIAMS, P. J.This is a bill in equity praying for specific performa'nce of an alleged contract. It
appears that Lane was the owner of a row
of seven houses which he offered for sale to
Alvord for $22,500. The offer was under
seal. Alvord was given ten days in which
to consider the proposition. No consideration was received from Alvord. Two days
after Lane obtained an offer from Jonathan
Trumbull for the same houses, of $26,000,
and deciding to accept this, he immediately
on the same day notified Alvord by letter
that he retracted his offer. Alvord taking
seven days longer to deliberate, on the
ninth day after the offer was made to him,
told Lane over the telephone that he
accepted the offer. Lane reminded him
that he had already withdrawn the offer.
The houses were worth $26,000. Lane when
he made the offer had for some time been
in bad health, was sleepless, dyspeptic,
easily excited, worried over his business
affairs, and apprehensive of calamities. Alvord files this bill to compel Lane to specifically perform the contract to convey.
The first inquiry to be made by the court
in the determination of the case at bar is
whether there was such a contractual relation between Lane and Alvord as would
entitle the latter to a decree for specific performance. The 'proper answering of this
question depends wholly upon the revocability of the sealed offer which Lane made
to Alvord. If he had the right to recall
his offer before the expiration of the ten
days, then no liability whatever could arise
if he saw fit so to do; but if, on the other

THE FORUM.
hand, he was legally bound to hold the
offer open for ten days and then recalled it
before the expiration of the time, we have
no hesitancy in saying that Lane would
beliable if Alvord accepted the offer within
the ten days. It is well settled that an
ofIr, though coupled with a promise to
hold it open for acceptance for a specified
time, may nevertheless be revoked or withdrawn before the time has expired, provided there is no consideration to hold the
offer open.-Dickinson v. Dodds, 2 Ch. Div.
463; B. & M. R%.R. v. Bartlett, 3 Cushing
924; Houghwout v. Boisanbin, 18 N. J.
Equity 315; Bosshardt & Wilson Co. v.
Crescent Oil Co., 171 Pa. 109.
It is contended by the learned counsel
for complainant that the offer being under
seal imports a consideration and therefore
is irrevocable, citing in support of the principle: Schmerty v. Shreeve, 62 Pa. 457;
Building Association v. Hull, 135 Pa. 565;
Hosler v. Hursh, 151 Pa. 415. As to the
correctness of this rule when applied to actions in law, we have not the least doubt,
but it has been suggested by the able counsel for defendant that equity requires an
actual consideration and that a mere seal
is insufficient. However universal the suggestion made by counsel for defendant may
be, we are nevertheless constrained to hold
that under the decisions in our state, the
offer made by Lane was irrevocable. Chief
Justice Agnew in his opinion in Corson v.
Mlulvany, 49 Pa. 88, supports ourposition.
That case settles beyond all doubt that the
contract in the case at bar did not lack
mutuality, hence enforceable in equity.
But notwithstanding the fact that we are
of the opinion that Lane had no right to
revoke his offbr, we are still confronted
with the question whether specific performance would lie under these circumstances. Weae of opinion that a decree
will not lie for the reason thatany circumstance that shows that a decree of specific
performance, even of a written agreement
of sale, would be unfair or inequitable, is
sufficient to defeat the application. - Maguire v. Heraty, Powel & Ux, 163 Pa. 381.
It would certainly be highly inequitable, in
our opinion, in the present case to deprive
the second vendee, Trumbull, of the right
to take advantage of his contract Wvith
Lane, inasmuch as he was ignorant of
Lane's previous agreement with the con-

plainant in this bill. The houses at $26,000
were no doubt a bargain and it would be
far from the purpose of equity to deprive
this apparently shrewd investor of the benefits of his keenness and sagacity. As to
the question of damages, we are of the
opinion that the plaintiff has an adequate
remedy at law for the breach of the contract and hence equity will not grant relief
in such a case.-Heurtt's Appeal, 88 Pa. 55;
Koch's Appeal, 93 Pa. 434; Smaltz's Appeal, 99 Pa. 312.
Bill dismissed.
Appeal by complainant.
Errorassigned,dismissal ofbill as above.
OPINION OF SUPREMWE COURT.

Lane offered, under seal, his seven houses
to Alvord for $92,500, at any time within
ten days. No consideration was received
by Lane for the offer. On the second day
after the offer was made, it was retracted
by letter, andseven days after its retraction,
Alvord telephoned to Lane his acceptance
of it. The houses were worth $26,000, and
the occasion of the retraction was an offer
from Jonathan Trumbull for the houses of
$26,000, and Lane's "deciding to accept
this."
Had Lane's offer to Alvord been in parol, it could, as there was no consideration
for it, have been withdrawn even within
the ten days, if it had not already been accepted.-Henthorn v. Fraser, 2 Ch. 27;
(Williston's Cases on Contracts); Dickinson v. Dodds, 2 Ch. D. 27; Cooke v. Oxley,
3 T. I. 653; Clark, Cont. 50. A revocation
after acceptance, it is needless to say, would
be too late.-Henthorn v. Fraser, sulpra;
Patrick v. Bowman, 149 U. S. 411; Boston
and le. R. R. v. Bartlett, 57 lass. 224.
But, Lane's offer was under seal. Had
there been a consfileration for it, it would,
even if in parol, have been beyond recall.
The seal imparts to it the same irrevocableness. An offer of land for ten days under
seal could be accepted even after an attempt
to recall it, and tie acceptance bound the
offerer.-O' Brien v. Boland, 166 Mlass. 481;
MeMillan v. Ames, 33 AMinn. 257; (Huffcut's Cases); Willard v. Taylor, 8 Wall, 557.
Says Anson, "An exception to this general
rule as to the revocability of an offer, must
be made in the case of offers under seal.
Such an offer cannot be 'evoked; even
though it is not communicated to the offer-
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ee,it remains open for his acceptance when
he becomes aware of its existence * * *
The position of the promisor is that of one
who has made an offer which he cannot
withdraw, or a conditional promise depending for its binding force on the assent
of the promisee."--Huffcut's Anson, Cont.
36; Clark, Cont. 47; Donnally v. Parker, 5
W. Va. 301, (3 L. R. A. 102.) In Mansfield v. Hodgson, 147 Mass. 304, Holmes, 3.,
says that an offer under seal to sell a farm
within 30 days "not having been a mere
offer, but a conditional covenant to sell,
bound him (the offerer) irrevocably to sell
in case the plaintiff should elect to buy,
and should pay the price within 30 days."
Boston & M. R. R.v. Bartlett, 3 Cush. 224.
Despite the attempted withdrawal of
Lane's offer, the acceptance of it by Alvord
converted it into a contract to sell.
While the courts of Pennsylvania as rigorously as those of other jurisdictions insist
on the presence of a consideration to make
a contract obligatory, they do not refrain,
in actions at law, from specifically executing wholly gratuitous promises to pay
money, however large the sum, if the
promise is under seal.-Burkholder v.
Plank, 69 Pa. 225; Mack's Appeal, 68 Pa.
231; Candor's Appeal, 27 Pa. 119; Rishel
v. Crouse, 162 Pa. 3; Anderson v. Best, 176
Pa. 498; Meeek v. Frantz, 171 Pa. 632; Ross'
Appeal, 127 Pa. 4; Hummel's Estate, 161
Pa. 215. But the contract between Alvord
and Lane is not gratuitous. The latter
undertakes to convey the land; the former
to pay $22,500 for it. The engagement to
keep the offer open for ten days was, it is
true, without consideration; but it is not
this, except indirectly and implicitly, that
the court is asked to enforce. It is asked
to enforce the contract springing out of the
acceptance; that is, to compel Lane to convey on Alvord's paying $22,500. It-is not
specifically executing a gratuitous promise
to convey.-MeMillan v. Ames, 33 Minn.
257.
It is urged that the contract is lacking
in such mutuality as will, alone, justify its
specific execution by the chancellor. Such
is not the view that has prevailed. Although the offerer could not, even before
the acceptance, withdraw the offer, despite
the acceptance being in the discretion of
the offeree, by that acceptance a contract
is made, and the unilateralness of the obli-

gation prior to such acceptance is no obstacle to specific performance of the. contract
completed by it.-Ely v. Beaumont, 5 S. &
R. 124; Kerr v. Day, 14 Pa. 112; D'Arras
v. Keyser, 26 Pa. 249; Smith's Appeal, 69
Pa. 474; Henthorn v. Fraser, 2 Ch. 27; McMillan v. Ames, 3 Minn. 257; O'Brien v.
Boland, 166 Mass. 481; Newell's Appeal,
100 Pa. 513; Corson v. Mulvany, 49 Pa. 88;
Yerkes v. Richards, 153 Pa. 646.
The difficulty supposed to arise from the
statute of frauds is unsubstantial. That
statute is satisfied if the vendor against
whom the decree is sought has signed the
contract. The Adhesion of the vendee to
it may be manifested by parol.-Sylvester
v. Born, 132 Pa. 467; Smith's Appeal, 69
Pa. 480.
But for the relation of Jonathan Trumbull to the land there could'be no doubt of
the propriety of the specific execution of
the contract between Lane and Alvord.
What is that relation'? The learned court
of common pleas assumes that there was a
binding agreement by Lane to convey to
Trumbull and it regards as highly inequitable the deprivation of Trumbull of the
advantages of that agreement. But (1) it
does not appear that there was any agreement between Lane and Trumbull. The
latter offered the former $26,000 for the
land, and "deciding to accept this," Lane
immediately retracted his offer to Alvord.
But was Lane's decision to accept communicated to Trumbull? A decision to
accept, uncommunicated, makes no contract.-Clark, Cont. 31. "Acceptance,"
says Anson, "means communicated acceptance, and whether or no the communication reaches the offerer, it must be something more than a mere mental assent."7
Huffcut's Anson, Cont. 23. AsAlvord has
.primafacie a right to the performance of
Lane's contract with him, the burden is on
Lane of defeating that right by showing a
countervailing equity in Trumbull. He
has failed to show a communication of his
acceptance.
(2) By the contract Alvord acquired the
equitable title to the land, Lane holding
the legal as a trustee for him.-Kerr v.
Day, 14 Pa. 112. This is true though no
purchase money has been paid.-People's
Street Railway Co. v. Spencer, 156 Pa. 85;
Frick's Appeal, 101 Pa. 485; Siter's Appeal,
26 Pa. 178. It is a familiar doctrine that
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an equitable interest can be enforced
against persons who have become grantees
from the holder of the legal title, subsequently to the origin of the equity, if (a)
such grantees have knowledge of such
equity before becoming such.-HaughNvout v. Murphy, 21 N. J. Eq. 118 ; 22 N.
J. Eq. 118; Snowman v. Harford, 57 Me.
397 ; Cole v. Cole, 41 Md. 301 ; Young v.
Young, 43 N. J. Eq. 27 ; Downing v. Risley, 15 N. J. Eq. 93; or if (b) although
grantees without such knowledge, they
have not paid the purchase money.-C. &
E. I. R. R. v. Hay, 119 Ill. 507; Wharmby's Estate, 4 Kulp, 21 ; and the recital of
the payment of the purchase money in a
deed to the second purchaser will not be
evidence of the payment as against the first
vendee.-Ball v. Campbell, 134 Pa. 602;
Lloyd v. Lynch, 28 Pa. 419; Coxe v. Sartwell, 21 Pa. 480. The burden of showing
the payment is on him who seeks to defeat
the first vendee's or the cestii que trust's
remedy.-Lloyd v. Lynch, 28 Pa. 419.
Whether Trumbull knew of the contract
with Alvord, we are not informed. It is
not necessary to decide, now, that the burden is on the defendant, if he wishes to
take advantage of Trumbull's ignorance,
to give some evidence of that ignorance.
The burden was plainly on him to show
that Trumbull had paid at least some of
the purchase money.
No objection has been taken to the omission of the name of Trumbull as a co-defendant.
In Pennsylvania there are two remedies
for the specific execution of a contract to
convey land, ejeetment or a bill in equity.
In the former, the vendee as owner seeks
to obtain the possession of the premises.
Of the latter, the aim is to compel a conveyance by the vendor to the purchaser.
Kramer v. Dinsmore, 152 Pa. 264. The
bill was, in this case, an appropriate remedy.
Before concluding, it may be well for us
to advert to the suggestion that equity
ought not to specifically enforce the Alvord
contract, because the result would be to deprive Lane of $3500. The fact that the
contract is not as beneficial as that which
might have beeii made with Trumbull, is
not reason for refusing to Alvord the aid
of the chancellor. A contract to sell land
for $26,000 which was worth $29,000 was

executed specifically in O'Brien v. Boland,
166 Mass. 481. In Frick's Appeal, 101 Pa.
485, the contract price was less than $9,000.
The subsequent rise of the valfte to $15,000
did not prevent a decree for specific performance.
The conclusion we have reached makes
it unnecessary to determine whether had
specific performance been refused, damages
could have been decreed under this bill.
Cf. Shafer's Appeal, 110 Pa. 382; Megu'ire v. Heraty, 163 Pa. 387.
And now, May 3, 1897, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed that the decree of the
court below be reversed, and the plaintiff's
bill reinstated. And it is further ordered,
adjudged and decreed that the defendant,
Richard Lane, upon the payment or tender to him of the sum of $22,500, convey
by good and sufficient deed to Alexander
Alvord the plaintiff, the land and premises described in the plaintiff's bill, and
pay the costs of this suit, and the record
is remitted for enforcement of this decree
by the court below.
CHAS. CONANT vs. ALFRED COPELAND AND AETNA FIRE INS. CO.
InsurableInterest-Interestof life-tenant
-_hqhts of remainder man-Amount recoverable by life-tenant.
Case stated.
THOirAs B. PEPPER and J. H. LINE for
plaintiff.
The plaintiff had an insurable interest.
Holbrook v. Brown, 2 Mass. 279; Angell
on Insurance, . 56, 57. The facts do not
show that there was any intention to insure anything but the life-tenant's interest. The remainder man can therefore
claim no part of the insurance money.
Foster v. U. S. Ins. Co., 11 Pick. 86; Turner v. Burrows, 5 Wend. 541; Welsh v.
Ins. Co., 151 Pa. 607; Mittenberger v. Beacom, 9 Pa. 200; Pitts. Storage Co. v. Ins.
Co. 168 Pa. 522.
The plaintiff had the property insured
in his own name and himself paid the premiums. He is therefore entitled to all of
the insurance money. Warwicker v. Britnail, 23 Ch. D. 188; Seymour v. Vernon,
-16 Jur. 189; Reyner v. Preston, 18 Ch. D.
1; Strong v. Mfg. Ins. Co., 10 Pick. 44;
London v. Waddle, 98 Pa. 242.
FRED. B. MOSER and A. T. MORGAN for

defendants.
Parties can insure only to the extent of
their interests. A. & E. Ency. Vol. II, p.

THE FORUM.
in trust or on commission therein." In
Ezra Finney, et. al. v. Fair Haven Ins.
Co., 46 Mass 192, it was for the part owner
"and the other owners." In Miltenberger
v. Beacom, 9 Pa. 198, it was a question for
the jury whether the insured intended the
insurance to cover the interest of the other
owners, having insured more than his interest. Evidence to establish this interest
by considering himself" entitled to insure
as their agent and at their expense" was
introduced, and the jury so found. Again,
in Welsh v. London Ins. Corporation, apBefore BRowN, P. J.; SAvIDGE and
pellant, 151 Pa. 607, somewhat similar to
LEIDY, JJ.
the present case, the life-tenant insured the
OPINION OF COURT.
full value of the fee. It was, however, her
BROWN, P. T.:-In a house in Carlisle intent to insure only her life interest; but
Chas. Conant had a life estate and Alfred through the inadvertence ofthe company's
Copeland the remainder in fee. Conant agents, the policy covered the full value of
took out an insurance on the house, neither the property. Upon the finding of the
the application nor the policy specifying jury, that the life-tenant intended to inthat the interest insured was but a life es- sure the property for herself and the retate. The fall value of the house was mainder-man, the tenant was allowed to
$5,000. The policy was for $3,500. Con-nt recover the full amount of the policy as
was, when he took out the policy (which trustee for the remainder-man.
In all of thesecases the life-tenant or coran for five years) 51 years old. A fire totally destroyed the house during the sec- owner secured only his proportionate share
of the policy money or was trustee for the
ond year of the policy, and the company
being willing to pay the $3,500, finds that remainder-man; (1) by reason of his acting
Copeland insists that either the funds as agent for him, (2) by the terms or
should be divided between him and Co- phraseology of the policy defining the class
nant in some fair proportion, or that it insured, or (3) from evidence supplying the
should be put into the hands of a trustee, intent to insure only his own interest as in
invested and its interest paid to Conant 151 Pa. supra and 50 Pa. 341. The present
for life and the principal at his death to case has none of these features. Will the
Copeland. The case stated is made to ob- law, then, presume that the intention of
tain the decision of the court. In the Conant was to insure Copeland's interest
cases cited by counsel for defendant, in so that Copeland can secure part of the
support of the proposition that the life policy money, in the absence. of any evitenant is a trustee for the remainder man dence in the case showing that such was
for the amount of insurance exceeding the his intention? We think that merely invalue of the life tenant's interest, there is suring more than"his interest is insufficient
an express intention on the part of the life to give rise to the presumption. On the
tenant to insure for himself and the others contrary, Conant disavows any such inteninterested in the property, or where this tion. It is therefore immaterial that the
intentjon is not explicitly showh it is im- remainder-man can ratify the act of the
plied from the tenant's insuring more than tenant either before the fire or subsequent
his interest but not for his exclusive bene- thereto. Whether or not the insurance
fit. In 11 Pickering 85, they were co- .company could avoid the policy wholly or
tenants, and the policy was "for the own- in part is a question with which we have
ers of the vessel" ; in Turner v. Burrows, not here to contend, the company express5 Wendell 541, "for account of whom it ing their willingness to pay the policy acmay concern or for account of the own- cording to the determination in this case.
ers." In 5 El. & B]. 868, the case involved Thus far we have been conceding that the
the peculiar incidents of a wharfinger's policy for $3,500 insured more than the
life-tenant's interest according to the corninsurance policy. It covered the "goods
313, and cases cited; Walsh v. London
Ins. Co., 151 Pa. 617. Conant's interest
amounts to only one-third of the value of
the fee. Datesman's Appeal, 127 Pa. 359;
Denison's Appeal, 1 Pa. 201; Ship pen's
Appeal, 80 Pa. 391. If company paid Conant the insurance, a portion of it would
inure to Copeland, or he would take it as
trustee for the remainder-man. Porter on
Insurance, 51; Walters v. Monarch, 5 El.
& BI. 870; Miltenberger v. Beacom, 9 Pa.
198; Walsh v. London Ins. Co., supra;
Finney v. Fair Haven Ins. Co., 46 Mass.
192; Manhattan Ins. Co. v. Webster, 59
Pa. 227.
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mon law rule of computing damages as
applied in Datesman's Appeal, 127 Pa. 359,
and Denison's Appeal, 1 Pa. 201, viz., that
the life estate is valued at one-third of the
value of the property sold or destroyed.
In determining the value of "alife interest
each case must depend on its own circumstances. 80 Pa. 391. But, as we have seen,
the application of this rule to the present
case is not all-decisive of the questions involved, so as to entitle the remainder-man
to participate in the distribution of the
policy money. On the other hand an honest representation of the value of the property to be insured although somewhat in
excess of its true valuation will not preelude the insured from recovering the full
amount. Susquehanna Mutual Fire Ins.
Co. v. Statts, 112 Pa. 529, 156 Pa. 420, and
Porter on Ins. 198. In Harrison v. Pepper, 33 L. A. R. 239, a case on all fours
with the one at bar, the court held that
when the life-tenant insured property in
his own nalne for its full value, he was
neither required to rebuild nor held accountable to the remainder-man for such
money. Each can insure his own interest. The contract is a personal contract
and inures to the benefit of the party with
whom it is made and by whom the premiwns are paid, and that the sum paid is
in no proper sense the proceeds of the property. Also Potter on Ins. 50.
We are of the opinion, therefore, that
judglmeit should be entered for the plaintiff for the ful anmount of the policy money.
SAvri)GE. J., dissenting.
Appeal by defendant.
Alrror assign'd, entry of judgment as
above.
OPINION OF SUPREM1E COURT.
Though the iEtna Fire Ins. Co. is a party
to this litigation, it is willing to pay the
amount of the policy. The real question
is, to whom is this payment to be made?
To Conant only, or, in part to Conant and
in part to Copeland? The application for
the insurance was made by Conant. He
paid the premium. He only is named In
the-policy -s the insured, and as the person to whom, in case of loss, the money is
to be paid. Conantis right to receive the
entire amount is primafacie clear. How
does Copeland encounter this apparent
right? He alleges that Conant insured,
not his own interest as life-tenant, but that

plus the remainder in fee of Conant, and
that the money payable on the policy is
the property of Conant and Copeland in
portions bearing to each other the ratio
which the value of alife estate bears to that
of the remainder.
What did Conant insure? He owned a
a life estate, and a life estate like a chattel
interest in land, (Phila. Tool Co. v. British
Am. Assurance Co., 132 Pa. 236,) it is needless to say, is an insurable interest. Harris v. York Mutual Ins. Co., 50 Pa. 341 ;
Harrison v. Pepper, 166 Mass. 288; Welsh
v. London Assurance Corporation, 151 Pa.
607; Kearney v. Kearney, 2 C. E. Green
59, 71; Norris v. Harrison, 2 Madd. 268.
Neither the application nor the policy
specified the quantity of the interest that
was undergoing insurance. That Conant
intended to procure or that the insurance
company intended to confer, insurance on
any larger interest, must be inferred if at
all from the want of the delimitation of the
interest, or from the amount at which it
was insured, as compared with its actual
value, or from a supposed duty of a lifetenant, when effecting insurance on his interest, to insure likewise that of the remainder-man.
No relation of trust exists between the
life-tenant and remainder-man which
obliges the former to insure for the benefit
of the latter. Harrison v. Pepper, 166
Mass. 298; Kearney v. Kearney, 2 C. E.
Green, 59, 71 ; Seymour v. Vernon, 16 Jur.
189, cited in Warwicker v. Bretnall, 23 Ch.
Div. 188, which holds the same doctrine.
Nor is the former, ipsofacto, an agent for
the latter, so that. in making insurance for
himself, he may be presumed to insure for
the latter. Successive owners.of the same
house are as loosely related to each other
as simultaneous owners of undivided parts
of the same house. One co-tenant of land
may insure his own interest and not the
others. Harvey v. Cherry, 76 N. Y. 436;
as may one co-tenant of a vessel, Finney
v. Fair Haven Ins. Co., 5 Mete. (46 Mass.)
192. Turner v. Burrows, 5 Wend. 541, (affirmed 8 Wend. 144). In Harris v. York
Mutual Ins. Co., 50 Pa. 341, a husband
tenant initiate by the curtesy, insured land
which was owned in fee by his wife. The
policy described the land as his, not as
hers, nor did it define the interest insured
in any way. The insurance was presumed
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to have been effected on the fee, on the
hypothesis of an agency, by the husband
for his wife. We know no other relation
from which the making of such a presumption would not be deemed temerarious.
What significance is there in the amount
of the insurance? The house was worth
$5,000. The amount of the insurance was
$3,500. Two methods have been adopted
for calculating the value of a life estate,
in comparsion with the fee. An exceedingly rough rule, viz., to estimate the
former as one-third of the latter, has been
applied in Denison's Appeal, 1 Pa. 201;
Datesman's Appeal, 127 Pa. 359; Shippen's
Appeal, 80 Pa. 391 ; and this rule has been
preferred for determining the relative
worth of a life estate, to the Carlisle Tables
in Shippen's Appeal, supra, and in Steinbrunner v. Railway Co., 146 Pa. 504. On
the other hand these tables have been recognized as a proper means for determining
the probable length of a life, in Steinbrunner v. Railway Co., 146 Pa. 504; McCue v.
Knoxville Borough, 146 Pa. 580; Kraut v.
Railway Co., 160 Pa. 329; Campbell v.
City of York, 172 Pa. 205. Although the
courts, in adverse proceeding, might adopt
the common law ratio of one-third, in adjusting the respective rights of life-tenants
and reversiones, we know nothing to forbid the adoption by one who is effecting
an insurance on his life estate of the approved tables of mortality, as a means of appraising the amount of his insurable interest. We could not say that the estimation of
the worth of a life estate by this rule would
imply fraud. The Actuaries', or Combined
Table, show that the expectancy of a man
fifty-one years old is nineteen and a half
years. The house was worth $5,000. At
six per cent. the interest on that sum annually would be $300. The present worth
of $300 to be paid every year for 19J years
is about $3,350. The difference between
this sum and $3,500. the amount of the insurance, is inconsiderable. There is no
room for the supposition of fraud; even if
fraud-as it could not--would have any effect in a controversy in which the only party
defrauded, the insurance company, waives
it. In Susquehanna Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v.
Staats, 102 Pa. 529, an honest estimate at
$8,000, of a house worth only $6,000, did
not vitiate the policy. For the same reason, there is no room for the inference from

the size of the insurance effected, that it
was intended, in part, for the remainderman. We do not overlook the fact that
many companies refuse to insure up to the
full value of the interest. The custom of
the Ytna Fire Ins. Co. does not appear,
and insurances almost if not quite up to
the value are not unknown. In Welsh v.
London Assurance Corporation, 151 Pa.
607, 618, Mr. Justice Mitchell states that
"the policy issued for the full value of the
fee." It may easily have been the intention both of Conant and of the company
to insure to the full value of the life-estate,
estimated on some presumption of life-expectancy founded on mortality tables, Conant's vigor, habits, vocation, ancestry,
etc. We think it would be hazardous to
guess from the amount of the insurance
that either or both of the parties to the
policy intended it to apply to more than
the life-estate.
Other evidence of Conant's intention to
insure the fee is absolutely wanting. There
are cases that hold that if the policy insures the property of the assured, or held
by him in trust or on commission, etc., the
insurance will apply as well to the property
in trust as to that of the assured. Pittsburg Storage Co. v. Scottish Union
Ins. Co., 16i8 Pa. 522; Waters v. Assurance
Co., 5 Ellis & B. 870; Siter v. Morss, 13
Pa. 218; Home Ins. Co. v. Baltimore
Warehouse Co., 93 U. S. 527; and those
for whom the property is held in trust.
etc., by the assured, can recover from him
the proper portion of the moneys received
by him from the insurance company. 13
Pa. 218. Conant's policy contains no similar phrase. There may be evidence dehors
the policy, that the assured in procuring
it intended it to cover not his own interest
merely but another's. In that case, the
whole amount may be recovered by the
person named in the policy from the company if a total loss occurs, but lie will be a
trustee as to part of it for the person intended to share in it. Welsh v. London
Assurance Corp., 151 Pa. 607; Miltenbcrger v. Beacom, 9 Pa. 198; Norris v. Harrison, 2 Madd. 268. Nor is it necessary in
order that this person may share in it, that
he should have authorized or even have
known of the insurance. He may ratify
either before or after loss, 9 Pa. 198; Finney v. Fair Haven Ins. Co., 5 Mete. (46
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Mass.) 192; and thus make a proper portion of the insurance money his own.
There is no evidence dehors Conant's policy of his intention to insure Copeland's
remainder.
There being no intention by A to insure
for B, the mere fact that A, in applying for
an insurance, pretends to have an interest
in the subject of the insurance which B in
fact has, does not make the insurance
inure to the benefit of B. The imposition on the insurer may discharge
him, but, if lie chooses to pay, A will
not receive the money as trustee or
agent for B. The fact that the sum received from the company by a life tenant
was equal to the full value of the fee,
would not make him trustee as respects
any portion of it, for the remainder-man
Harrison v. Pepper, 166 Mass. 288. Still
less will a life-tenant insure for the remainder-man, when without intention to
insure the latter, he with his own money,
insures his interest to a not excessive degree, Warwicker v. Bretnall, 23 Ch. Div.
188; Seymour v. Vernon, 16 Jur. 189 (cited
in 23 Ch. Div. 188); 166 Mass. 288 6upra.
It follows that the conclusion reached by
learned court below is correct, and its
judgment is affirmed.

The implied contract of a physician who
attends a patient is, not that he will certainly effect a cure, but that he will use all
known and reasonable means to accomplish that object.-Hairev. Reese, 7 Phila.
138; Chamberlin v. Morgan, 68 Pa. 168;
Reber v. Herring 115 Pa. 599; Carpenter
. 488; Small v. Howard,
v. Blake, 60 N.
128 Mass. 131.
Before WINGERT, P. J., KANTNER and
BARKER, JJ.
CHARGE OF THE COURT.
KANTNER, J.

Gentlemen of the Jury:On 17 January, 1894, the plaintiff,
Thomas Aldrich, was engaged to be married to Miss Rebecca Allen, the ceremony
to take place in January, 1895. Aldrich
was seized with. a tenacious cough in August, 1894. His friends thought he was a
victim of plithisis pulmonalis. Miss Allen's
father was unwilling that his daughter
shou~ld marry a consumptive and agreed
for himself and daughter that if Aldrich
would submit to a medical examination
and be declared non-cdnsumptive, his
sickness should not be an obstacle to the
marriage. If, however, his ailment was
pronounced consumption, Aldrich agreed
to renounce the engagement of marriage.
Assenting to the proposition, Aldrich, at
Allen's request, was induced to consult
Dr. James Palmer, the defendant. Accordingly the examination was made. Dr.
THOMAS ALDRICH vs. JAS. PALNMR.
Palmer pronounced Aldrich seriously affected with consumption, whereupon, it
Physician'sliability .for incorrect diagno- was agreed by Miss Allen, her father and
sti.- The diligence,care and skill requir- Aldrich that the marriage should no longer
feasure of
ed by profesuonal men. be considered. Three months later Aldamages.
drich's cough diminished and in four
weeks was entirely gone. Physicians
Action in Trespas.
whose competen.cy was not questioned, deHARRY M. PERSING and V. LLOYD
clared as witnesses at the trial that AlSNYDER for the plaintiff.
drich's trouble was not pulmonary, nor
Physician taking charge of a patient,
serious, and that at no time did the sympassumes an implied obligation to treat the
toms indicate consumption. This suit is
case with reasonable diligence, care and
brought by Aldrich against Dr. Palmer
skill.-Fowler v. Sergeant, 1 Grant 3.55;
Chamberlin v. Morgan, 68 Pa. 168; Potter
for unskillfulness in diagnosis and for the
v. Warner, 91 Pa. 362; Olmsted v. Gere,
resulting loss of his contemplated mar100 Pa. 127; Small v. Howard, 128 Mass.
riage.
131.
It is a well-settled principle of law in
The amount of skill and diligence required is such as thoroughly educated
Pennsylvania that a professional man is
practitioners ordinarily employ. Lauphier
under obligations to employ such reasonv. Phipos, 8 Car. & P. 476; Carpenter v.
able skill and diligence as is ordinarily exBlake, 75 N. Y. 12; McCandless v. McXWha,
ercised in his profession, and in determin22 Pa. 261-8.
MIL.S H. MURRi and G. FREDERICK ing this degree of skill the progress of the
profession must be taken into consideraVOWINCKEL for the defendant.
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tion. McCandless v. McWha, 22 Pa. 261;
Haire v. Reese, 7 Phila. 138; Potter v.
Warner, 91 Pa. 362; Olmstead v. Bailey,
100 Pa. 127. Proof of a want of such care
and skill as the law requires is a pre-requisite to the maintenance of this action.
Did Dr. Palmer exercise such reasonable
skill and diligence as physicians ordinarily
employ in similiar cases? If he did, he is
not liable. If he did not, he is liable in
damages for any injury caused directly by
his unskillfulness and negligence.
In the absence of satisfactory proof to
establish the charge, the presumption is
that the defendant was competent for the
task which he undertook and performed
the duty to the best of his ability. Dr.
Palmer pronounced Aldrich's ailment as a
serious affection of consumption. In this
he erred since Aldrich recovered from his
sickness four months later. If there was
nothing more, this would at least indicate
an error of judgment, for which he would
not be responsible. But the medical witnesses, who testified on the plaintiff's behalf, stated that Aldrich's complaint was
not serious and that the symptoms at no
time indicated consumption. This evidence being uncontradicted, we are justified in saying that it sufficiently proves
the absence of such reasonable skill and
diligence on the part of Dr. Palmer, as is
ordinarily employed by medical practitioners in this enlightened age in the
treatment of one of the most common
diseases with which the human race is afflicted. Add to this the physicians' testimony that the trouble was not even pulmonary, what might have been regarded
as a mere error of judgment is transformed
into so gross a mistake as to be inconsistent with reasonable care, skill and diligence.
The defendant not having used the skill
and diligence required by law is liable
therefor to the plaintiff for any injury directly caused by his unskillfulness and
negligence. McCandless v. McWha, 22
Pa. 261; Fowler v. Sergeant, 1 Grant 355;
Chamberlin v. Morgan, 68 Pa. 168; Olnstead v. Gere, 100 Pa. 127. The plaintiff
claims damages for the loss of his contemplated marriage. For this no damages can
be allowed because the defendant is not
responsible for any injury resulting from
any other cause than the treatment given

by Dr. Palmer. Potter v. Warner, 91 Pa.
362. The breach of Aldrich's engagement
to Miss Allen was not the natural result
of Dr. Palmer's incorrect diagnosis. Ioreover, there can be no recovery for the loss
of the contemplated marriage, because it
is a well-known principle that the breach
of an existing contract of marriage by the
interference of a third party is not a legal
wrong for which damages can be given.
Cooley Torts, p. 236.
No facts being in dispute, we therefore
direct you gentlemen of the jury, to assess
damages for the plaintiff for all costs and
expenses to which he has been necessarily
subjected by reason of the defendant's incompetency in diagnosis, without regard
however to the breach of the contractual
relation between Thomas Aldrich and Miss
Allen.
Appeal by the defendant.
Error asigned, instruction of the court
as above.
oPrNioN OF SUPREMiE COURT.

Thomas Aldrich has lost an expected
marriage with Rebecca Allen, and he attributes this loss to the opinion expressed
by James Palmer, concerning the nature
of his sickness. In this action he seeks to
recover damages from Palmer.
When a physician undertakes to treat a
patient, he is bound to bring to the task
ordinary skill and care. If he does not,
he will be compelled to compensate the
patient for any resulting damage. This
principle is supported by so many cases,
that reference to more than those cited by
the learned court below is superfluous.
The physician does not, it is true, guarantee the accuracy of his opinion as to nature of the disease, or the justness of his
selection of medical measures and agencies,
McCandless v. McWha, 22 Pa. 261; Patten
v. Wiggen, 51 Me. 504; Ely v. Wilbur, 49
N. J. L. 685; 14 Am. & Eng. Encyc. 80,
for an ordinarily careful and intelligent
physician may err in these respects.
James Palmer was not employed by Aldrich to treat, nor did lie treat, him for a
disease. He was simply to examine the
patient and declare the character of his
disease. Not he was to act on the opinion
thus formed, but Aldrich and Rebecca
Allen. Should the judgment be, that the
disease was not phthisis lulmonal!s, the

THE FORUM.
contemplated marriage between them was
to be performed. Otherwise it was to be
abandoned. Does the same duty in respect
to skill and diligence attach to Palmer in
the formation of this opinion as if it was
to be the foundation of a treatment of Aldrich? We think it does.
When a physician formally certifies that
X is insane, in a proceeding instituted to
secure the confinement of X as a lunatic,
he will be liable to X, if, X being thereupon
confined, he is nevertheless sane, and the
error is the result of a want of competent
care and intelligence. Ayers v. Russell,
50 Hun, 282; 14 L. R. A. 429; 14 Am. &
Eng. Encyc. Law, 77; Pennell v. Cummings, 75 Me. 163. In a case, remarkably
like the present, in which a marriage was
lost by a man because of a physician's
mistaken diagnosis of his disease, it was
held that he was bound to exercise ordinary diligence and learning, although the
purpose of the examination was information and not treatment. Harriott v. Plim'ton, 166 Mass. 585. We see no reason for
applying a less rigorous rule of responsibility, if the physician undertakes to give
a professional opinion, for any purpose,
other than treatment. He is selected for
his professed skill, and he should decline
tc accept the task, if he is unwilling to
discharge itunder the ordinary legal sanction.
Was there evidence justifying the submission to the jury of the alleged unskillfulness and negligence? Before and at the
time of the examination of him, Aldrich
had a tenacious cough which alarmed his
friends. Within the three following
months, however, it perceptibly diminished, and, four weeks afterwards, entirely
disappeared.
There is competent testimony that the disease was not pulmonary,
that it was not serious, and that, to the
practiced intellect of the physicians, it
never had the aspect of consumption. We
think it was proper to allow the jury to infer from this evidence that Palmer was
mistaken in his opinion, and that the mistake would not have been made had he
had ordinary learning and skill.
But, it is in vain to find that Palmer was
bound to exercise competent skill and care,
if no actionable damage has resulted from
the want of them. The damage is the loss
of the marriage with Rebecca Allen. That

such a loss is a legal damage is evidenced
by the numerous cases founded on breaches
of the promise to marry. In some of such
cases exemplary damages are allowed;
Baldy v. Stratton, 11 Pa. 316; 2 Am. &
Eng. Encyc. Law, 526. In all of them
substantial damages are recoverable. And
a man as well as a woman may obtain
these damages; 2 Am. & Eng. Encyc. Law,
525. Some of the considerations for which
damages are allowed in such suits, e.g.,
the degradation, the wounded feelings do
not exist here. But others of the elements
of injury; pecuniary loss, loss of the expected consortium are here present. As respects these elements, the loss is equally
grave whether caused by the repudiatioil of
the contract by the other party, or by the
mutual renunciation of it, induced by the
erroneous information concerning the sickness of one of the parties. In Harriott v.
Plimpton, supra the court without difficulty held that Harriott's loss of the marriage, through the false and unskillful
diagnosis of the physician, gave him a
right to damages.
It is a mistake to suppose that Aldrich's
cause of action is the breach by Rebecca
Allen of the contract, induced by Palmer.
She and Aldrich agreed each to release the
other, if Palmer's diagnosis should be thus
and thus. There was no breach of the
contract. There was a mutual rescission
of it. Were there doubt then, of the liability of a third person for inducing X toviolate his contract with Y, this doubt could
not affect the relation of Palmer to Aldrich
and Allen. The charge against Palmer is
that he unskillfully pronounced the judgment upon which rescission of the contract
was to hinge.
What we have already said intimates
that we are not able to accept the opinion
-of the learned court of common pleas, that
no damages can be recovered for the loss of
the contemplated marriage. As for a confinemefit in an asylum caused by a wrong
attribution of insanity, so for the loss of
the advantage of marriage, caused by a
wrong attribution of any other disease,
the physician is liable. Cases supra. The
instruction of the learned court of common
pleas upon this point was too favorable to
the appellant. He therefore cannot complain of it.
Judgment affirmed.
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VAIL et al vs. WARD et al.
Will-Interpretationof word "heir s
Fee Simple.

"-

Ejectment.
JAmms H. O'BRIEN, J. F. SCOTT and
GARRETT STEVENS for the plaintiff cited:
Caldwell v. Skilton, 13 Pa. 152; Karker's
Appeal, 60 Pa. 141; .McCullough v. Fenton,
65 Pa. 418; Mickley's Appeal, 92 Pa. 514;
Lawrence v. Lawrence, 105 Pa. 335; Coles
v. Ayres, 156 Pa. 197; Grimes v. Shirk, 169
Pa. 74.
CHAS. T. RALSTON and WARREN H.
SmrocK for the defendant cited:
Smith v. Folwell, 1 Binney 546; Baughman v. Baughman, 2 Yeats, 410; James'
Claim, 1 Dallas 47; Paxton v. Lefferts, 3
Rawle 59; Guthrie's Appeal, 37 Pa. 9
Curtis v. Longstreth, 44 a.297; Seeley v.
Seeley, 44 Pa. 434, Gast v. Baer, 62 Pa. 35;
Doebler's Estate, 64 Pa. 9; Kleppner v.
Laverty, 70 Pa. 70; Ingersoll's Appeal, 86
Pa. 240; Carroll v. Burns, 108 Pa. 386;
Cochran v. Cochran, "127Pa. 486; King v.
Frick, 135 Pa. 575; Hackney v. Tracy, 137
Pa. 53; Robinson's Appeal, 149 Pa. 418;
Evans v. Smith, 166 Pa. 625; Grimes v.
Shirk, 169 Pa. 74.
Before COSTELLO, P. J., WINGERT, A.
A., SmnTH and SHOENER, JJ.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

COSTELLO, P. J.-Wilmot Vail, the testator, died about April Ist, 1861, after having made his last will, which was duly
proved, and letters testamentary granted
to his sons David S. Vail and Peter J.
Vail, the executors therein named. By
his will the testator provides for the distribution of the land in question as follows:
"I give and bequeath to my daughter
Mary Ward and her heirs 15 acres of land
adjoining the highway. It being or laying parallel with the highway. The buildings included thereon, the burying ground
except that is now walled in for that
purpose, but if she should die without heirs
then it is to be divided equally with my
other children, David S. Vail, Peter J.
Vail, and Arminda Wetherly."
We now proceed to ascertain the character of the estate acquired by Mary Ward.
This will, like all others, must be construed
with every part of it in view, and so as
to give effect to the testator's whole intention, unless it be in part contrary to law,
or impossible.
It is very clearly settled, both in Eng-

land and in this state, that if a bequest be
made to a person absolute in the first instance, and it is provided that in the event
of death, or death without issue, another
legatee or other legatees shall be substituted to the share or legacy thus given, it
shall be construed to mean death or death
without issue before the testator. The
first taker is always the first object of the
testator's bounty, and his absolute estate
is not to be cut down to an estate for life,
or what is practically the same thing, to
be subjected to an executory gift over upon
the occurrence of the contingency of death
or death without issue at any future period
within the rule against perpetuities
without clear evidence of such an intent.
Caldwell v. Skelton, 1 Harris 152; Estate
of Maiary Biddle, 4 Casey 59; Karker's Appeal, 10 P. F. Smith 141; Stevenson v. Fox,
19-.5
Pa. 568; Mickley's Appeal, 95 Pa. 514;
and Fitzwater's Appeal, 94 Pa. 141.
Examining the will further, as to the
sense in which he used the word "heirs,"
viz: But if she should die without heirs
then it is to be divided equally with my
other children David and Peter Vail and
Arminda Wetherly. By heirs he doubtless meant to designate her children. In
the event of her death leaving no heirs of
her body, the property was to go over, but
if she left heirs, the necessary implication
is that they would take as heirs by succession from her, and not as devisees directly from the testator. It follows, therefore, that the word heirs in this clause
must be considered a word of limitation
and not a word of purchase. And the
failure of heirs contemplated in the devise
over, was an indefinite failure-a failure at
any time after her death, and not merely a
failure at the time of her death.
In view of this interpretation we hold
that an estate in fee tail vested in Mary
Ward, which under our act of April 27,
1855, becomes a fee simple. Allan v. Henderson, 49 Pa. 333; Cochran v. Cochran,
127 Pa. 486; Criley v. Chamberlain, 30 Pa.
161.
From either standpoint, therefore, it will
be seen that Mary Ward took a fee simple
estate in the property devised to her by
her father, Wilmot Vail, and that, therefore, the defendants are entitled to possession.
Appeal by plaintiff.
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Error assigned, entry of judgment as
above.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.

The death without issue intended might
be a death at some definite time after the
death of the testator. It might be a death
at any time, however remote, after that of
the testator. The established interpretation of the phrase used by Wilmot Vail
and of phrases of similar import, makes it
mean, if it does not mean a failure of issue
in the testators' lifetime, an indefinite failure of issue. Eichelberger v. Barnitz, 9
W. 447; Sugden v. McKenna, 147 Pa. 55;
Cochran v. Cochran, 127 Pa. 486; Amelia
Smith's Appeal, 23 Pa. 9; Matlack v. Roberts, 54 Pa. 148; Hoff's Estate, 147 Pa. 636;
Lawrence v. Lawrence 105 Pa. 385- Vaughany. Dickes, 20 Pa. 509, Hackney v.
Tracy, 137 Pa. 53; Lapsley v. Lapsley, 9
Pa. 130, nor does the circumstance that on
the default of issue, the land is devised
over to persons living when the will is
written, make this interpretation inadmissible; Eichelberger v. Barnitz, 9 W. 447;
Vaughan v. Dickes, 20 Pa. 509; Hackney
v. Tracy, 137 Pa. 53; Covert v. Robinson,
46 Pa. 274; Amelia Smith's Appeal 23 Pa.
9; Lawrence v. Lawrence, 105 Pa. 335.
And it matters not that those taking under
the devise over are named. 105 Pa. 335;
20 Pa. 509; 137 Pa. 53; 9 W. 447.
If the expression "if she should die
without heirs," means ifshe should die, etc.
in the lifetime of the testator, it has no
effect on the fee given to Mary Ward, for
she did not die during the testator's lifetime. If it means, if she should at any
time, however remote, be without lineal
heirs, then the effect of it was to convert
what, but for it, would have been a fee
simple into a fee tail. 127 Pa. 486; 23 Pa.
9; 147 Pa. 636; 105 Pa. 335; 20 Pa. 509; 137
Pa. 53. But the fee tail was instantly reconverted into a fee simple by the act of
April 27, 18-55, 1 P. & L. 1882. It follows
that Mary Ward had a devisable estate,
which passed to her step-son, Theron
Ward the defendant. Itfollowsalsothatthe
limitation over to the testator's other children, David S., Peter J. and Araminda,
never took effect, because it is an executory devise limited upon the normal extinction of a fee simple.
Judgment affirmed.

Wilmot Vail died April 1, 1861. Two
sons, Peter J. and David S., and two
daughters, Araminda Weatherly and
Mary Ward, survived him. His will contained this devise. "I give and bequeath
to my daughter Mary Ward and her heirs
15 acres of land adjoining the highway, it
being or laying parallel with the highway, the buildings included thereon, the
burying ground excepted, that is now
walled in for that purpose, but if she
should die without heirs, then it is to be
divided equally with my other children,
David S. Vail, Peter J. Vail and Araminda
Wetherly."
Mary Ward died April 1,
1895, devising the land obtained by her
under Wilmot Vail's devise, to her stepson Theron Ward. Theron Ward, with
his father, Job D., husband of Mary Ward,
is now in possession. Before Mary Ward,
her brothers and sister had died, Peter
Vail leaving a son Calvin, Araminda
Weatherly, a son Ira, and David S. Vail,
a daughter Mary. These nephews and
this niece of Mary Ward are the plaintiffs
in the ejectment.
The words "I give and bequeath to my
daughter Mary Ward and her heirs,"
standing alone would have given her a
fee-simple. They are followed by the
words "but, if she should die without
heirs, then it, (the land) is to be divided
equally with my other children." What
effect have these words upon the interpretation of the devisee?
The heirs in default of whom the devise
over is to take effect, are lineal heirs, issue,
for the deviseover is to brothers and a sister
of Mary, who are the nearest collateral
heirs. The absence of collateral heirs
SIMON ARCAND vs. OSBORN
could not then have been intended.
COLBURN.
Cochran v. Cochran, 127 Pa. 486; Covertv.
Robinson 46 Pa. 274; Ray v. Alexander,
Liability for injuries sustained by the
146 Pa. 242, Coles v. Ayres, 156 Pa. 197.
fall of a gallery of an opera house-Liability of lessor, of lessee-Instructionto the
The death without heirs is susceptible of
Jury.
three interpretations.
It might mean
death without issue before the testatoi.
Action in Trespass.
King v. Frick 135 Pa. 575; Mickley's ApJ. TaoMuPsON CALDwELL and A. M. DEpeal 92 Pa. 514; Stevenson v. Fox, 125 Pa.
vALL for defendant.
568; Coles v. Ayres, 156 Pa. 197; Fahrneys
1. The first instruction given by the
v. Holsinger, 65 Pa. 388, Caldwell v. Skilcourt is erroneous, because the evidence
ton; :13 Pa. 152; McCullough v. Fenton, 65
does not show that the defendant had
Pa 418; Harker's Appeal, 60 Pa. 141.
actual knowledge of the strength of the
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gallery. Actual knowledge is necessary
in order that the defendant might'be held
liable.
2. The second point in the charge was also
erroneous.-P. & R. R. R. Co. v. Schertle,
97 Pa. 460; Mansfield Coal & Coke Co. v.
McEnery, 91 Pa. 185; Wein v. Simpson, 2
Phila. 158; Walden v. Finch, 70 Pa. 460.
PAUL J. SCHIDT and FRANCIS LAFFERTY for plaintiff.

The instructions of the court were
proper.-(l) Camp v. Wood, 76 N. Y. 92;
Wunder v. McLean, 134 Pa. 334; Currinv.
Boston Music House, 135 Mass. 414. (2)
Daly v Savage, 1 Am. Rep. 429; Durant
v. Palmer, 27. J. L. 548; Knauss v. Bran,
107 Pa. 85; Lindsay v. Lighton, 150 Mass.
288; Looney v. McLean, 129 Mass. 36;
Watkins v. Goodall, 138 Mass. 537; Kirby
v. Boston Market Asso., 80 Mass. 251.
Before NoRTHRUP, P. J., GRIswox-n and
IRVING, JJ.

OPINION OF COURT.
GRISWOLD, J.--Colborn, the owner of
an opera house, let it for a series of entertainments to John Beale.
The written contract stated that it was
let for June 6, 7, 8 and 9, 1893, building to
be lighted, and that the money paid for
tickets purchased should be received by
Colburn, who was to deduct therefrom the
rent agreed on, $10 per night; the entertainments were continued on June 11, '12
and 13, under an oral agreement by
Colburn and Beale for the continuance of
the lease.
Thirty spectators, among whom was
Arcand, on the night of June 13th, were
upon the gallery when it fell, and several
including the plaintiff were seriously injured. The gallery was intended for the
use to which the spectators put it; and
that spectators to the number of those who
went upon it, could go upon it might have
been regarded as likely.
There had been discussions as to the
galery's sufficiency of strength, some reports condemning it, some maintaining
that it was strong enough. Of the difference of opinions (olburn was aware. Certain witnesses testified that the gallery
was plainly unsafe, and that it had not
been properly constructed. Plaintiff requested instructions to the jury which
were given: 1. Colburn, owner is liable to
Arcand if he knew, or ought to have
known that the gallery was unsafe when
thirty persons were upon it. 2. The
lease toBeale, and the fact that the spectators entered the gallery on Beale's invitation, do not excuse Colburn. Defendant
requested the court to say, request denied,
1. That Colburn was not an insurer of
the safety of the gallery, even in such use
as was reasonably to be expected. 2. The
fact that Beale had control of the building
under a lease exempted Colburn from responsibility. A verdict was obtained by

Arcand for $297. Motion for a new trial
because of alleged misdirection.
The law seems well settled in Pennsylvania, that a landlord who lets a house,
with knowledge that it is unsafe, from
some hidden defect, and fails to warn
the tenant, is responsible in damages to
one who enters the premises by virtue of
the lease, and is injured by accident arising from such defect, providing there is no
contributory negligence on the part of the
The entry upon the
person injured.
premises by the one who has suffered
amage must have been lawful; thus, a fall
into an unfenced pit, or an open trap-door
would give no right of action to a trespasser, but would surely entitle a visitor or
lodger to compensation. Wein v. Simpson, 2 Phila. 158; Mansfield Coal Co. vs.
McEnnery, 91 Pa. 185.
The principal question in this case is,
then, the propriety of the first instruction
given for the plaintiff, which was as follows: "Colburn, owner is liable to Arcand
if he knew or ought to have known that
the gallery was unsafe when thirty persons were upon it. It is contended on the
strength of Mansfield Coal Co. v. McEnnery, 91 Pa. 185, that there was not
sufficient evidence of negligence on the
part of Colburn to allow the case to go
to the jury; but that case is far different
from this, as the question of contributory
negligence on the part of the person injured, induced the court to decide that
case, while that point does not enter into
the present case, and further, in the case
cited Paxon, C. J., says: "If, however, the
defendants had knowledge of such defects,
more especially if notice had been given to
them thereof, and they had neglected to
make the necessary repairs, they would be
responsible, not only to strangers, but even
to one of their employees, provided he was
not chargeable with concurring negligence
or want of proper care or neglect of duty
on his part." True, i there had been no
evidence, or at least a mere scintilla of
evidence of negligence of defendant, the
court should have withdrawn the case
from the jury, and given binding instructions for defendant. P. & R. R. R. Co. v.
Schertle, 97 Pa. 450. But, in this case,
there was evidence showing that the safety
of the gallery had often been questioned,
and that the defendant knew that fact. In
view of this, did he act as a reasonably
prudent man? We think not. Knowing
that the safety of the gallery was a matter
of serious debate, it was his duty to ascertain for himself, and act accordingly;
otherwise we would be led to the absurdity
of allowing every landlord to wait until
the leased property has actually caused
damage before making repairs, for, until
the accident occurs, no one knows positively that anyone will be injured.
A case involving similar principles is
that of Dickson v. Hollister, 123 Pa. 421,
when it was held that to charge the owner
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of premises with notice of its condition, in
order to affect him with negligence, it is
not necessary that the defect should be so
notorious as to be evident to all pedestrians
passing in the immediate neighborhood.
The remaining question is: Did the lease
to Beale relieve Colburn from liability?
We think not.
In Knauss v. Bran, 107 Pa. 88, Gordon,
C. J. says: "We are inclined to think that
a lessor cannot merely by leasing his
premises, avoid the consequences of a
nuisance, which, before such leasing, it
was his duty to abate," and this opinion
we consider fully established by the decisions.
Motion for new trial over-ruled.
Defendant appealed.
Errorassigned,instructions to jury.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
Two errors are assigned in the judgment
of the court oL common pleas, its instruction to the jury, (1) that the relation of
Osborn Colburn as lessor, or licenser to
John Beale, as lessee, or licensee, did not
exempt Osborn from liability to Simon
Arcand, (2) that Colburn was liable, if he
knew or ought to have known that the
gallery was unsafe with thirty persons
upon it, and that it would not be unlikely
that thirty persons would be upon it.
(1) For nuisances created upon the demised premises by the tenant, the landlord would not be liable. If, however, the
premises are, when put into the possession
of the lessee, in such a state that they
probably will in the use of them, contemplated by both lessor and lessee, produce
injury to other persons, both the lessee and
lessor will be liable when such injury follows. Wunder v. McLean, 134 Pa. 334;
Fow v. Roberts, 108 Pa. 489; Knauss v.
Brua, 107 Pa. 35; New Salem v. Eagle Mill
Co., 137 Mass. 8; Ingwersen v. Rankin, 47
N. J. L. 18; Dalay v. Savage, 145 Mass. 38;
Durant v. Palner, 5 Dutch. 544, Schilling
v. Abernethy, 112 Pa. 437; Swords v. Edgar, 59 N. Y. 28; Albert v. State, 66 Md.
325.
Colburn let the opera house for a series
of entertainments. He was to have charge
of the box receipts and was to retain from
them nightly $10. ie demised the premises to be used in the very manner in
which they were used. He cannot therefore exonerate himself from responsibility
for the injuries resulting from this very use
because he had put the house into the
control of Beale. Oxford v. Lathe, 165
Mass. 254; Godley v. Hagerty, 20 Pa. 387;

Carson v. Godley, 26 Pa. 111; Latham v.
Roach, 72 Ill. 179. Had Beale used them
for an object for which they were not designed, and without the concurrence of
Colburn, he would not have been liable.
Edwards v. N. Y. & H. R. R. R. Co., 98
N. Y. 245.
(2) If Colburn knew that the gallery
was unsafe with thirty persons upon it,
and that it was not unlikely that that
number of persons would be upon it, he is
plainly liable for the consequences. Oxford v. Lathe, 165 Mass. 254. If he has
reason to think that his lessee will put the
building to a severer strain than it is able to
bear, he should stipulate against .such use.
Godley v. Hagerty, 20 Pa. 387.
The instruction of the court proposed a
somewhat more stringent standard of responsibility. The jury were told that if
Colburn "ought to have known" that the
gallery under such use as was probable
was unsafe, he would be liable to Arcand.
The strength of the gallery had been a
subject of discussion, some experts condemning it, some approving, and Colburn
was aware of this difference of opinion.
He was also being its owner, acquainted
with the gallery, and there was evidence
that it was "plainly unsafe," and that it
had not been properly constructed. It
was not error then, to refer to the jury the
question whether Colburn "ought to have
known" the unsafeness of the gallery.
Letting the building for that particular
use, he was bound to satisfy himself
whether it could be employed in that way
without peril, and he was bound to exercise ordinary caution and industry in obtaining this satisfaction. Inviting persons
into the opera house, he was obliged to be
reasonably sure that he was not inviting
them into danger; Cooley, Torts, 718. He
must take the ploper precaution to make
the structure safe; Oxford v. Lathe, 165
Mass. 254, and this implies that he must
take the proper precaution to determine
whether it be safe. In Walden v. Finch,
70 Pa. 460, the defendant had employed a
proper architect and builders, and he was
not liable for the collapse of his warehouse
on account of occu It defects. If the facts suggestive of defects in the gallery were such
as should have led to investigation, and
if the investigation, conducted with proper
assiduity, would have led to the discovery
of the imperfections of the gallery, Colburn
plainly "ought to have known" of those
imperfections. That with knowledge of
them he would be responsible for the results of them, is not disputable.
Judgment affirmed.

